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ARTICLE
REPRESENTATION REINFORCEMENT:
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO A
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS PROBLEM
ANITA S. KRISHNAKUMAR*
One of the most valuable-and disturbing-insights offered by public choice
theory has been the recognition that wealthy, well-organized interests with nar-
row, intense preferences often dominate the legislative process while diffuse,
unorganized interests go under-represented. Responding to this insight, legal
scholars in the fields of statutory interpretation and administrative law have
suggested that the solution to the problem of representational inequality lies
with the courts. Indeed, over the past two decades, scholars in these fields have
offered up a host of John Hart Ely-inspired representation reinforcing "canons
of construction," designed to encourage judges to use their role as statutory
interpreters to tip the scales in favor of groups believed to be under-represented
in the political process. This Article takes issue with such judicial solutions and
instead proposes a legislative solution to what is, at bottom, a legislative process
problem. A legislative solution has many advantages over a judicial one: (1) it
avoids judicial usurpation of legislative power; (2) it reaches all legislation, not
only those laws which become the subject of litigation; and (3) it has the poten-
tial to empower traditionally disadvantaged interests at the lawmaking stage,
rather than merely reduce the harm worked upon them at the statute-interpreting
stage. The Article argues for a new framework statute designed to institutional-
ize a congressional precommitment to evaluate the impact that proposed legisla-
tion will have on politically disadvantaged groups. It concludes by advocating a
modified, but enduring, judicial role, limited to enforcing this congressional
precommitment.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most valuable-and disturbing-insights provided by public
choice theory has been the recognition that wealthy, well-organized interests
with narrow, intense preferences often dominate the legislative process
while diffuse, unorganized interests go under-represented. Building on this
insight, and on the Supreme Court's prescient footnote four in Carolene
Products,' John Hart Ely revolutionized constitutional law by arguing for a
"participation-oriented, representation reinforcing approach to judicial re-
* Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. A.B., Stanford University,
1996; J.D., Yale Law School, 1999. Many thanks to John Barrett, Richard Bierschbach, Eliza-
beth Garrett, Lori Ringhand, Kevin Stack, Brian Tamanaha, Nelson Tebbe, Robert Tsai, and
David Zaring for helpful advice and comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The Article also
benefited from discussions with participants in workshops at the University of Virginia Law
School, New York Law School, and St. John's Law School. Special thanks to the editors at the
Harvard Journal on Legislation for excellent editing work.
'United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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view"2 of democratically-enacted statutes. In the late 1980s, legal scholars
began applying the insights of public choice theory and Ely's representation
reinforcement principle to the field of statutory interpretation, arguing that
courts deliberately should construe statutory language to promote the inter-
ests of diffuse and under-represented groups over those of narrow, well-or-
ganized ones. These second-generation 3  representation reinforcement
("SGRR") scholars took Ely's justification of judicial review one step fur-
ther-urging Courts to use their judicial power not only to invalidate laws
that harm "Carolene" groups protected under the United States Constitution,
but also to interpret laws in ways that would ameliorate fundamental repre-
sentational inequalities in the legislative process.
From its inception, SGRR scholarship has exploded with suggested ca-
nons of construction designed to help judges interpret statutes in favor of
politically-disadvantaged interests. The suggested canons take various
forms, including: William Eskridge's and Cass Sunstein's proposal that am-
biguous statutory language be construed in favor of the politically-disadvan-
taged or under-represented litigant;4 Susan Rose-Ackerman's and Jonathan
Macey's proffered rule that statutes should be interpreted consistently with
the public-regarding purposes set forth in their preambles, ignoring any con-
tradictory interest group deals hidden in their substantive provisions;5 and
Eskridge's and Sunstein's tenet that statutes explicitly manifesting a purpose
to benefit narrow interests at the expense of diffuse ones (e.g., statutes con-
taining tax or antitrust exemptions for certain groups, or appropriations stat-
utes) should be narrowly construed.6
This Article argues that such judicially-based solutions are fundamen-
tally inadequate to the task of reinforcing the representation of disadvan-
taged groups in the political process. In lieu of judicial remedies, it
advocates a legislative solution to this legislative process dysfunction. Spe-
2 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87
(1980).
1 call these scholars "second-generation" only in the sense that their application of rep-
resentation-reinforcement principles to the statutory interpretation context derives from Ely's
original representation-reinforcement theory. The term is not meant to suggest that these schol-
ars came significantly later in time than Ely; in fact, some were his colleagues or
contemporaries.
ISee, e.g., WILLM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 153 (1994)
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION]; Cass Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 405, 472 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes].
5 See, e.g., SUSAN ROsE-AcKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 44-45,
52-53 (1992) [hereinafter RosE-AcKERMAN, PROGRESSIVE AGENDA]; Jonathan Macey, Pro-
moting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 250-52 (1986); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and
Economics-and the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 352-53 (1988) [hereinafter
Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law].
6 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 323-24 (1988) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Politics Without Romance]; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 4, at 474.
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cifically, the Article proposes that Congress pass a framework statute en-
trenching a legislative precommitment to evaluate the impact that proposed
legislation will have on diffuse, unorganized, and traditionally under-repre-
sented groups. As recent scholarship has shown,7 such framework precom-
mitments are an increasingly common feature of the legislative process-
often implemented through information-forcing rules such as the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act's s cost estimate requirement or the National Environ-
mental Protection Act's 9 environmental impact statement requirement. 0 In
this vein, the Article proposes that Congress enact a representation reinforc-
ing framework requiring all proposed legislation to be accompanied by an
impact statement that outlines the legislation's expected effect on various
interests. The interest impact statement should indicate: who Congress in-
tends to benefit, who it acknowledges will be harmed, who supported the
bill, who opposed it and, if Congress wishes, broad instructions on which
interests the statute should be construed to favor or disfavor. The frame-
work's guiding principle should be to force Congress to deliberate, ex ante,
about which interests will be harmed by the legislation it passes, rather than
allow Congress to focus, as it often does, solely on which groups will be
benefited. In other words, the proposed framework should commit Congress
to engage in an interest group harm-benefit analysis before enacting certain
types of statutes. Moreover, this legislative precommitment to greater repre-
sentation and consideration of disadvantaged groups' interests in the legisla-
tive process should be reinforced by the judiciary through deferential,
process-ensuring canons of construction. However, the starting point should
be a legislative commitment to greater representation of disadvantaged
groups, not a judicial imposition of substantive preferences for such groups'
interests at the statutory interpretation stage.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II makes a theoretical case for
a legislature-centric, rather than judiciary-centric, solution to the problem of
under-representation in the legislative process. Part III outlines a general
proposal for a representation reinforcing framework statute, modeled on ex-
isting legislative frameworks, that would institutionalize a congressional
precommitment to evaluate the impact that proposed legislation would have
I See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 717, 749-55 (2005) [hereinafter Garrett, Framework Legislation] (discussing
precommitment as one of the purposes of framework legislation); Elizabeth Garrett, Harnes-
sing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI.
L. REv. 501, 512 n.43 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett, Harnessing Politics] (noting that "in the
budget context, supormajority [sic] requirements and other institutionalized structures can op-
erate as precommitment devices to avoid collective action problems that reduce Congress's
ability to achieve preferred policy outcomes."); Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The
Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REv. 335, 342-43 (2006)
(describing internal budget rules as precommitment devices).
I Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
9 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
1o See discussion infra Section Il.A.3.
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on politically disadvantaged groups. Part IV concludes by advocating a mod-
ified, but enduring, judicial role in enforcing this congressional precommit-
ment to reinforced representation of disadvantaged groups' interests during
the lawmaking process.
II. THE CASE FOR A LEGISLATURE-CENTRIC, RATHER THAN JUDICIARY-
CENTRIC, REMEDY TO REPRESENTATIONAL INEQUALITY
Given their court-centered training, it is perhaps unsurprising that legal
scholars have turned to the judiciary to solve the legislative process dysfunc-
tions illuminated by public choice theory. But in so doing, the legal academy
has overlooked a better, and equally legal, solution: institutionalization of a
legislative precommitment to account for the interests of traditionally disad-
vantaged groups during the lawmaking process. A legislative solution of this
sort has many advantages over a judicial approach: (1) it would avoid
"countermajoritarian" difficulties, or judicial usurpation of legislative pow-
ers; (2) it would reach all legislation, not only that which eventually be-
comes the subject of litigation; and (3) it has the potential to empower
traditionally disadvantaged interests at the lawmaking stage, rather than
merely reduce the harm worked upon them at the statute-interpreting stage.
This Part reviews the SGRR scholars' proposals and argues that they are less
effective than an ex ante legislative solution.
A. Representation Reinforcing Canons of Construction
Scholars advocating a representation reinforcing approach to statutory
interpretation have borrowed, sometimes consciously, from John Hart Ely's
seminal articulation of the principle." Yet in applying representation rein-
forcement to the statutory context, these scholars have gone far beyond Ely's
pale, advocating a form of judicial activism so blatant as to undermine Ely's
fundamental objective of legitimizing judicial review to the public.
Ely's central project was to justify judicial review and provide an an-
swer to the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" posed by his teacher and men-
" See ROSE-AcKEmAN, PROGRESSIVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 45 (acknowledging that
her recommendations "reflect concerns similar" to those raised by John Ely and noting that
"Ely's aim, like mine, is to reinforce democratic representation by adding greater realism to
judicial interpretation of statutes and review of the legislative process." (emphasis omitted));
ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 141-73; William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Fetch Some Soupmeat, 16 CARnozo L. REV. 2209, 2221 & n.56 (1995) (comment-
ing that "John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980), develops a representation-
reinforcement theory of judicial review, and Eskridge, [in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation]
ch. 5, extends this theory to statutory interpretation."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CON-
STITUTION 143-44 (1993) [hereinafter, SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION]; Sunstein, Inter-
preting Statutes, supra note 4, at 473-74, 474 n.258 (noting, for example, that Ely's theory of
judicial review based on representation reinforcement at least arguably supports an interpretive
rule favoring minimum welfare rights).
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tor, Alexander Bickel.12 Ely reconciled this counter-majoritarian judicial role
with the ideal of representative democracy by arguing that courts should
intervene only where the political process is undeserving of deference
because:
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to en-
sure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though
no one is actually denied a voice or vote, representatives beholden
to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some
minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recog-
nize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority
the protection afforded other groups by a representative system. 3
In other words, Ely's conception of representation reinforcement was that
judges should trump actions taken by the people's elected representatives
only when those representatives either: (1) used their power to entrench
themselves against electoral defeat irrespective of the public's wishes; or (2)
were so hostile toward or prejudiced against a minority group that they sys-
tematically denied that group the rights and protections given to other
groups. Ely's classic cases for intervention thus included, among others, in-
cumbents (under the first category) and racial minorities and aliens (under
the second category).14
By contrast, the SGRR scholars' project is to use interpretive rules to
change the way the legislative process itself works. Their focus is not so
much on protecting minorities as on reducing wealth transfers to powerful
interests at the expense of diffuse groups' interests. Indeed, Eskridge and
Sunstein, joined by Macey and Rose-Ackerman, define as a central demo-
cratic failure the legislative process's tendency simultaneously to produce
too many rent-seeking statutes and too few public goods statutes. 5 These
SGRR scholars thus articulate a common goal: to render it more difficult for
wealthy, rent-seeking interests to achieve deep legislative success.' 6 To this
end, each scholar proffers his or her own set of interpretive rules designed to
12 In Bickel's words, the counter-majoritarian difficulty is rooted in the fact that "judicial
review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system," allowing unelected, insulated judges to
invalidate, or at least define the scope of, statutes and policies enacted by a democratically-
elected legislature. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrIcs 16-23 (2d ed. 1986).
13 ELY, supra note 2, at 103.
'4 See id. at 73-75 (citing the Warren Court as an exemplar of Ely's participational ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation, for its decisions protecting racial minorities, aliens, ille-
gitimates, and poor people), 103 (discussing elected representatives' self-interest), 161
(discussing majority hostility towards and exclusion of aliens in particular).
"5 Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 6, at 285.
6 See, e.g., id. at 311-12; ROSE-ACKERMAN, PROGRESSIVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at
52-55; Macey, supra note 5, at 239-40 (advocating an interpretive rule designed to enable
courts to "serve as obstacles to the goals of rent-seekers"); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes,
supra note 4, at 471 (recommending narrow construction and clear statement rules to limit
enforcement of statutes that effect naked wealth transfers to powerful interests).
2009]
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deny force to statutory provisions benefiting narrow, privileged interests-
except in those instances where a blatant congressional intent to transfer
wealth to narrow interests is spelled out clearly on the face of the statute.
The move away from Ely's vision of limited judicial intervention aimed at
protecting the interests of unpopular, deliberately disadvantaged minori-
ties-and towards selective judicial reengineering of interest group deals
struck in the legislature-could not be more stark.
Among the SGRR scholars, William Eskridge, Jr. is perhaps the most
open about the counter-majoritarian nature of his recommendations. 17 Es-
kridge offers up a host of representation reinforcing canons of construction
designed to help judges and administrators interpret statutes in a manner that
counteracts political market failures. First, he argues that in close cases,
where the meaning of a particular statutory text is ambiguous, interpreters
should consider which party or group will have more effective access to the
legislative process if it loses and interpret the statute against the party with
greater access. 8 In other words, statutory interpreters should pay attention to
the likelihood that the losing interest will be able to stimulate legislative
attention to its concerns-the more political power a group has, and the
more likely it is to get its concerns onto the legislative agenda, the more
inclined interpreters should be to rule against it in a close case. Second,
Eskridge recommends that interpreters should treat "public goods" statutes
differently than rent-seeking statutes. Whereas rent-seeking statutes should
be narrowly construed, according to Eskridge, interpreters should recognize
that "public goods" laws designed to distribute benefits and costs will not
stimulate strong interest group support (because no singular interest benefits
substantially), 9 and thus are not likely to be updated as time passes. Conse-
quently, when construing "public goods" statutes, interpreters should fill in
for legislators and update, or read updates into, such statutes.20
Sunstein' s recommended representation reinforcing canons of construc-
tion place an emphasis on legislative deliberation and would require, inter
alia, that: (1) interpretations involving constitutionally sensitive interests or
groups be remanded to the legislature or administrative agencies for recon-
sideration if the lawmaking body appears to have deliberated inadequately in
the first instance;' (2) statutes designed merely to transfer wealth to a partic-
ular interest or group be narrowly construed, unless they contain a clear
1' In fact, Eskridge explicitly touts counter-majoritarian statutory interpretation as "nor-
matively desirable if it contributes to the overall legitimacy of the political system" and ex-
horts judges, when construing statutory language, to "resolve or even create ambiguities so as
to counteract distortions in the political process." ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRE-
TATION, supra note 4, at 157. Moreover, he urges judges to interpret statutes in this corrective
manner even when doing so would produce a result that contravenes legislative expectations.
Id.
is Id. at 153.
'" See id. at 157-58.
20See id. at 158.
21 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 4, at 471.
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statement of the legislature's wealth-transferring intent;22 (3) statutes be con-
strued in a manner that forces those who are politically accountable and
highly visible to make, take the heat for, and deliberate carefully about regu-
latory decisions; 23 and (4) statutes be construed to impose benefits roughly
commensurate with their costs-unless there is a clear legislative statement
to the contrary. 4 At the same time, Sunstein advocates that those few stat-
utes which do benefit disadvantaged rather than wealthy political groups be
construed liberally, so as to protect the disadvantaged groups. 25
Rose-Ackerman proposes that interpreters construe statutory provisions
consistently with the statute's (typically public-goods-promoting) preamble
or statement of purpose.26 Under this rule, if a statute's preamble promises
diffuse, distributed societal benefits (as most do) but the statute's substantive
clauses effect narrow interest group transfers, then courts should refuse to
enforce the inconsistent substantive clauses. 7 When it comes to judicial re-
view of agency actions, Rose-Ackerman is even bolder. Here, she urges an
interpretive rule requiring agencies to implement the net-benefit-maximizing
solution.28 Further, she encourages courts to apply a presumption that agency
regulations have adopted the net-benefit-maximizing approach, in order to
make it especially difficult for politically powerful interests to obtain wealth
redistribution at the hands of agency policymakers. 29 Finally, Rose-Acker-
man argues that courts should seek to ensure that agency policymaking
processes are open to all interested individuals, groups, and organizations
and that all who have a stake in a particular policy are given public notice
and an opportunity to provide information. 0 Ironically, she does not suggest
that courts seek to ensure similar open access to the legislative process-a
goal that this Article's proposed legislative solution endeavors to achieve.3'
(None of the other representation reinforcement scholars suggest this either,
but Rose-Ackerman's omission in this regard is particularly noteworthy be-
cause she urges something so similar in the administrative context.)
Macey's proffered interpretive approach distinguishes between genuine
public interest statutes on the one hand, and what he calls "hidden-implicit"
and "open-explicit" special interest statutes on the other hand.32 "Hidden-
implicit" statutes are those which, according to Macey, "are couched in pub-
lic interest terms to avoid the political fallout associated with blatant special
22 Id. at 471, 486.
23 Id. at 477.
24 Id. at 487.
25 Id. at 472-73.
26 See ROsE-AcKERMAN, PRociRssivE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 52.
27 Id.
28 Specifically, courts should require agencies to "make a plausible case" that they have
engaged in a cost-benefit analysis and chosen a course of action that "maximizels] net bene-
fits subject to statutory, budgetary, and informational constraints." Id. at 39.
29 See id.30 See id. at 41.
31 See discussion infra Section III.A.2.
32 Macey, supra note 5, at 232-33.
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interest statutes," while "open-explicit" statutes are "naked, undisguised
wealth transfers to a particular, favored group."33 Along with Eskridge, Sun-
stein, and Rose-Ackerman, Macey favors judicial under-enforcement of
"hidden-implicit" statutes, which he argues will force special interests either
to forgo efforts to obtain redistributive wealth transfers or to incur the higher
political costs associated with "open-explicit" wealth transfer statutes.34
Where Macey differs from the others is that he sees no need to prescribe
new interpretive rules to achieve this end. Rather, Macey believes that tradi-
tional methods of statutory interpretation focusing, for example, on a stat-
ute's stated purpose, already undermine the value and restrain the passage of
"hidden-implicit" statutes.35
B. Countermajoritarian Redux
Although they offer different prescriptive approaches, the SGRR schol-
ars all, at bottom, call upon the judiciary to manipulate statutory meaning in
order to balance out judicially-perceived representational inequalities in the
legislative process. To be sure, these scholars hope their proposed interpre-
tive regimes ultimately will motivate the legislature to produce better stat-
utes in the first instance,36 but until then and to the extent that does not
happen, they advocate open and deliberate judicial scale-tipping in order to
protect certain interests, and punish others. Thus, Sunstein calls for "aggres-
sive" judicial protection of statutory gains won by diffuse interests, such as
the environment, endangered species, and the broadcasting public-gains he
says often are "jeopardized in the post-enactment political 'market' "-but
advocates "narrow construction" of statutes where the sole purpose is to
transfer wealth to private interests, such as banking and agriculture.37 Es-
kridge similarly urges courts to update distributed costs or distributed bene-
fits statutes because these are the most likely to be forgotten or ignored by
33 Id.
3 4 Id. at 238.
35 Id. at 250-52.
36 See, e.g., Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 4, at 477 (explaining that the goals
behind his proposed interpretive rules are "to promote accountability and deliberation in gov-
emnment, to furnish surrogates when both are absent, to limit factionalism and self-interested
representation, and to further political equality"); Macey, supra note 5, at 238, 261-262 (ex-
plaining how his proposal will force special interests to abandon efforts to obtain wealth trans-
fers and claiming that "[i]f used properly, these suggestions will improve the performance of
the legislature by increasing its incentives to act in the public interest"); Eskridge, Politics
Without Romance, supra note 6, at 310 ("The effect of all this would be to raise the overall
costs of rent-seeking legislation-drafting and lobbying costs as well as the risk of total defeat
in either the legislature or the courts-to groups seeking a slice of the public pie. Because
interest groups seeking rents will generally not spend more than the anticipated reward in order
to obtain the statutes they desire, raising the costs of such statutes would discourage some rent-
seeking legislation, though obviously not all of it."); ROSE-ACKERMAN, PROGRESSIVE
AGENDA, supra note 5, at 44 (arguing that courts should take a more active role in increasing
Congress's accountability to its constituents).
" Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 4, at 486-87.
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legislatures post-passage, but counsels that ambiguous statutes should be in-
terpreted against the party or interest with greater legislative access. 8 Even
Rose-Ackerman and Macey ask courts to ignore, or read out of existence,
those statutory provisions deemed to effect narrow interest group transfers,
unless the statute's preamble or statement of purpose explicitly references
the wealth transfer.
All of these proposed interpretive rules represent a move away from
Ely: Ely's concern was to justify judicial review and obtain heightened scru-
tiny for statutes that harm certain, typically constitutionally-protected,
groups-not to require automatic partial invalidation of all statutes benefit-
ing narrow, powerful interests or automatic enhancement of all statutes ben-
efiting traditionally disadvantaged interests. While their efforts to remedy
underlying dysfunctions in the legislative process are admirable, the SGRR
scholars call for judicial assessment of which regulatory statutes and which
interests are entitled to extra, versus diminished, protection falls prey to the
very charge Ely sought to deflect: judicial super-legislating.3 9 In asking
courts to super-enforce public goods statutes and under-enforce rent-seeking
ones, Eskridge, Sunstein, Macey, and Rose-Ackerman invite judges to use
their own personal values and predilections to determine which groups are
politically disadvantaged, and which statutes are rent-seeking rather than
public-regarding. 40 One judge's political process "failing" may well be
viewed by another judge as "democracy at work."'41 This is precisely the
kind of value-laden judicial approach against which Ely struggled. Indeed,
31
8 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 153.
39 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 90 (1997) (calling Macey's proposal "judicial activism of a quite
swashbuckling variety").
40 To be sure, Eskridge offers courts his own hierarchy of relative political advantage to
use in lieu of falling back on judges' personal values. See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 153. But, judges are unlikely simply to accept unquestion-
ingly the word of even a well-respected scholar such as Eskridge. First, on a matter as unscien-
tific as this one, the temptation to rely on one's own intuition likely runs high. Second, and
more importantly, Eskridge's methodology is questionable. The hierarchy he provides is culled
from his published study of interest group success at obtaining legislative overrides of unfa-
vorable Supreme Court rulings. His hierarchy table assumes that if a Supreme Court interpreta-
tion disfavoring a group was overridden later by Congress, the group that benefited from the
override was politically powerful, and that if a group seeking an override was not successful, it
was because the group was politically weak. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). There are a number of
obvious limitations to this reasoning, as Eskridge himself acknowledges, including that he
reviewed only a sampling rather than the full universe of failed congressional override at-
tempts. See id. at 341 & n.24. Moreover, factors other than political power-such as whether
there was an ideologically-identifiable split on the Court that rendered the decision and
whether the Court relied on the statute's plain meaning in arriving at its decision-may have
influenced the success or failure of an override attempt. See id. at 343-53. Third, even if
Eskridge's hierarchy were a perfect metric for relative political advantage, it would be far from
complete in coverage and would leave courts with no guidance in ranking numerous interests
affected by statutes that are likely to come before it.
4' Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1389,
1425 (2005).
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Ely defended judicial intervention with respect to democratically-enacted
statutes only as necessary to ensure that the political process remains open to
all groups-particularly those discrete and insular minorities protected by
the Constitution. He did not defend, let alone advocate, a roving judicial
license to pick and choose among interest groups for favored/disfavored
treatment or to enforce one part of a statute (e.g., the preamble) over other
parts (e.g., substantive provisions favoring narrow interests). Reengineering
statutory meaning in this manner goes far beyond "say[ing] what the law
is,"'42 and usurps the legislature's power to decide what the law should be.
C. Courts as Sledgehammers
Despite the decidedly counter-majoritarian effect of activist statutory
interpretation, SGRR scholars openly embrace it as preferable to letting the
legislature craft its own rules to guard against representational inequalities.
Why? Because they believe that courts, unlike legislatures, are not particu-
larly susceptible to interest group pressure, and therefore are better posi-
tioned both to craft legal rules designed to curb rent-seeking and to update
distributed costs/distributed benefits statutes.43 Moreover, they argue that lit-
igation involves at least two parties representing opposing interests and pos-
sessing substantial incentives to present all relevant information, so "there is
not the utter dearth of opposing viewpoints that one frequently finds in the
legislative process."4
This argument has its merits. But it ignores the significant risk that
when judges enter the political foray by engaging in interpretive rewriting of
statutes, they inevitably become the targets of political forces that wish to
ensure that particular statutes are interpreted in their favor. Therefore, shift-
ing responsibility for ensuring representational equality from the legislature
to the judiciary ultimately may achieve little more than the politicization of
the judiciary. In fact, several scholars argue that such politicization already
has occurred,45 and that judges are as susceptible as legislators to political
pressures.4
6
Even if we accept the assumption that interest groups exert greater pres-
sure on Congress than on the courts, there remains the larger question of
how to balance competing interests, costs, and benefits in particular regula-
tory contexts. It seems unlikely that courts are better equipped than legisla-
42 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
43 See, e.g., Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 6, at 300-01.
44 Id. at 304.
45 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281, 1304 (1976) ("Litigation inevitably becomes an explicitly political forum and the
court a visible arm of the political process."); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004
Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HAav. L. REv. 32, 46 (2005).
46 See Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 45-48, 63-64 (1991) (arguing that judges are as susceptible to favor-
ing wealthy interests as legislators).
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tures or agencies to weigh the harm to certain interests against the benefit to
others or to calculate the socially optimal legislative balance. Indeed, the
interpretive rules proposed by the SGRR scholars do not come close to ask-
ing courts to engage in such balancing. Rather, the "representation reinforc-
ing" canons take something of a sledgehammer approach, imposing a blunt
and definitive presumption that diffuse, politically weak interests always
should be favored over narrow, powerful ones, in all statutes and in all cases.
These canons dictate the result of the interpretive analysis before the inquiry
even begins. There are no empirics or cost-benefit analyses in this court-
centric approach. Instead, it relies on the judge's intuitions to determine what
constitutes a "distributed-costs/distributed-benefits statute," in Eskridge's
formulation, 47 or a statute reflecting the unusual bypass of regulatory failure
on behalf of a true public interest, in Sunstein's formulation.48 The statutes
then automatically receive a narrow or generous construction based solely
on the results of these intuitions.
But a distribution away from diffuse interests in favor of powerful ones
is not always socially undesirable. The mere fact that a statute redistributes
wealth from politically weak to politically powerful groups does not mean
that it does not also advance the public good. Interpretive rules that impose a
blanket presumption in favor of the politically weaker group in all cases
ignore gray areas and fail to make room for the cost-benefit comparisons
such gray areas require.
D. The Inefficacy of a Judicial Approach
The crux of the SGRR scholars' proposals is judicial enforcement of a
representational equality norm. Through canons of statutory construction-
e.g., minimal enforcement of statutes designed to transfer wealth to powerful
interests (except where the wealth-transferring intent is clearly revealed on
the statute's face) and refusal to enforce rent-seeking statutory provisions
(unless the rent-seeking goal is mentioned in the statute's preamble)-they
seek to force Congress to make explicit, and to pay the political costs of
making explicit, any legislative decision that violates this norm in favor of a
particular interest or interests.49 The judicial corrective is supposed to work
by pressuring Congress to enact fewer rent-seeking statutes and to be blatant
" Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 6, at 324; William N. Eskridge, Dy-
namic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1518-19 (1987).
48 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 4, at 472-73.
49 In this, their proposals are similar to the Supreme Court's clear statement rules in the
federalism context, which have been described as judicial enforcement of an under-enforced
constitutional norm. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitu-
tional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAD. L. REv. 593
(1992). That is, judicial interpretive rules force Congress to defer to state entities (i.e., to
respect federalism norms) unless Congress makes an explicit, clear statement on the face of a
statute indicating its intention to override state entities' authority.
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about those it does enact,50 lest a court refuse to enforce ambiguous wealth
transfers. Less directly, the threat of a judicial sledgehammer is also sup-
posed to increase the costs to interest groups of procuring rent-seeking stat-
utes in the first place by forcing groups to expend extra resources convincing
members of Congress to favor them despite the public fallout likely to ac-
company passage of a blatant wealth-redistributing statute.5
The problem with this strategy, however, is that many, if not the major-
ity, of statutes enacted into law by Congress will not come up for judicial
review,52 and those that do may not be reviewed until many years after they
are enacted. Transfers enacted as earmarks through the annual appropriations
process are not subject to judicial review at all.53 This means that many
wealth-transferring statutes will never be subjected to a judicial corrective,
even if their rent-seeking provisions are hidden behind a public-regarding
preamble and refuse to make clear the interest group deals they effect. Many
other wealth-transferring statutes will operate for years, achieving their rent-
seeking purposes to full effect, before a lawsuit brings them before judges
wielding representation reinforcing canons of construction capable of ending
their dysfunctional reign. Congress knows this. Therefore, in enacting rent-
seeking statutes, Congress is free to play a game of probabilities. This is a
game that Congress (and powerful interests) will win, and that the courts
(and politically disadvantaged interests) will lose.
It is well established that the effective cost of a crime to the perpetrator
is equal to the penalty multiplied by the probability of getting caught.5 4
Analogously, so long as the probability that a particular statute will come up
for judicial review remains low, the effective cost to Congress of ignoring
the representation reinforcing canons of construction when drafting statutes
50 See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, PROGRESSIVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 53, 55, 62; Es-
kridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 6, at 310; Macey, supra note 5, at 254, 261;
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 4, at 471 (advocating an interpretive rule requiring a
clear statement before courts will construe statutes as amounting to naked wealth transfers).
"I See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, PROGRESSIVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 53, 55, 62; Es-
kridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 6, at 310; Macey, supra note 5, at 254.
52 Cf Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on
the Supreme Court's Constitutional Rulings, 1987-2000, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533, 545 (2006)
(observing that of 3725 enacted statutes eligible for judicial review between 1987 and 2000,
the Supreme Court struck down only 22); cf also Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political
Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
1113, 1115-16 (1997) (making a similar argument about incomplete judicial review of statutes
that violate federalism principles).
" Earmarks are governed by internal House and Senate rules, and rely upon internal con-
gressional enforcement, through a point of order. There is, at present, no judicial review availa-
ble if Congress violates its own internal earmark rules. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to
Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2009).
" See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 176-79 (1968). Applying this to the representation-reinforcement context, the "crime,"
or behavior for which deterrence is sought, is passage of a rent-seeking statute that does not
clearly reveal itself to be such or that masquerades as a public-regarding statute, and the "pen-
alty" is judicial under- or non-enforcement of the statute.
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also will be low, no matter how high the penalty imposed by the courts. (A
high penalty multiplied by a near-zero probability of getting caught always
delivers a near-zero effective cost.) This dynamic is exacerbated by the fact
that even when a statute does become subject to judicial review, some repre-
sentation reinforcing canons, including Eskridge's relative political access
rule, will not even apply unless the rent-seeking statute is deemed ambigu-
ous. Of course, where the statute at issue is a high-profile one, such as Title
VII or the Patriot Act, Congress may sense a greater likelihood of judicial
review down the line (i.e., a higher probability of getting caught) and may
feel compelled to pay some attention to the representation reinforcement
scholars' clarity-forcing interpretive rules. But in the vast majority of cases,
Congress is likely to ignore these rules.55
Thus, the primary effect of the court-centric, "representation reinforc-
ing canons" approach is likely to be after-the-fact judicial curtailment of the
reach of statutes deemed to be rent-seeking, and judicial enhancement of
statutes deemed to be public-regarding-not the production of fewer rent-
seeking statutes or more public-regarding statutes in the first place. This is a
second-best solution, with obvious anti-democratic consequences. By con-
trast, a legislature-centric solution aimed at forcing Congress to pay more
attention to which interests it is benefiting or harming ex ante, while it is in
the process of enacting legislation, has the advantage of affecting all poten-
tial statutes, not only those that eventually become subject to judicial review.
It is deliberation-forcing as well as transparency-inducing. This is significant
because, as Macey has pointed out,56 Congress does not always legislate
with full information or knowledge that it is benefiting certain interests over
others. Bringing this information to light through litigation after a statute has
been passed, as the SGRR scholars' judicial solution would do, could take
years and would provide at best a piecemeal remedy. A legislative solution,
by contrast, would force fuller information at the deliberation stage, when it
could affect legislative decisions, instead of allowing rent-seeking statutes to
be enacted without full congressional understanding and relying on litigation
eventually to impose a judicial corrective or to inspire legislative
amendment.
A fundamental difference between this Article's proposed legislative
solution and the SGRR scholars' court-centric solution, then, is that a legisla-
" Cf Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Con-
gressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600-05 (2002) (finding in a case study of the
legislative process that legislative aides "are well aware of the general principles of statutory
interpretation and do have in mind generally how a court would interpret language they are
writing," but noting that "in the ordinary course of drafting [legislative aides] do not spend
substantial time anticipating or attempting to research the judicial application of particular
interpretive law to the bill being drafted"). The study also quoted legislative aides unapologeti-
cally citing time pressures and a need for deliberate ambiguity as a requisite for achieving
consensus as intrinsic legislative process features that work to undermine statutory clarity. Id.
at 594-95.
56 See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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tive solution would focus on bringing the costs and benefits of pending leg-
islation to legislators' attention, rather than on punishing narrow wealth
transfers at the judicial review stage. In fact, a key failing of the SGRR
scholars' approach is that it does not seek to empower politically disadvan-
taged groups, or to bring their concerns into the legislative process. Instead,
it seeks only to limit the capacity for gain by politically powerful, narrow
interests.
Further, even after a court construes an ambiguous statute against a
politically powerful group or narrows the benefit conferred by a rent-seeking
statute, the powerful group can-and, if the court is forthright about what it
is doing, likely will-go back to Congress seeking an amendment clarifying
that the statute was intended to benefit the group. Worse, powerful groups in
this position might seek passage of an entirely new statute, containing a new
hidden wealth transfer to the group beneath a new public-regarding pream-
ble, on the theory that it will take at least a few years before that statute
makes its way through the courts. Moreover, such second bites at the apple
are likely to succeed because the representation reinforcing canons do noth-
ing to give politically diffuse or disadvantaged groups a voice in the legisla-
tive process with which to push back against demands made by powerful
groups. Nor do these canons provide any mechanism through which to force
Congress to confront the true costs of the legislation it enacts. An impact
report requirement would provide such a mechanism.
To be sure, judicial review of a statutory provision affecting a diffuse,
disadvantaged group can bring the issue to the group's attention and spur
some organizational advocacy. But as Eskridge's work on congressional
overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretations demonstrates, such liti-
gation-induced awareness often does not translate into political power-let
alone political power sufficient to overcome countervailing pressure exerted
by a powerful opposing interest. 7 There is something gnawingly unsatisfac-
tory and short-lived about a remedy meant to address representational ine-
quality that does so little to empower underrepresented groups.
III. A REPRESENTATION REINFORCING FRAMEWORK STATUTE
Faced with public choice theory's gloomy portrait of the legislative pro-
cess, SGRR scholars essentially have thrown up their hands and concluded:
Congress clearly cannot be trusted, so we must devise a way for the judici-
ary to step in and correct Congress's mistakes. I have argued in Part II that
such judicial correctives are both undemocratic and inefficient, and that our
polity would be better off with a legislative solution to this legislative pro-
cess dysfunction. But the question remains: How can Congress be trusted to
" See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 40, at 361-62 (describing frequent overrides of judicial
interpretations benefiting the diffuse, marginalized, politically disadvantaged group of criminal
defendants and suspects).
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police itself? Won't the same incentives that lead members of Congress to
cater to wealthy, powerful interests at the expense of diffuse, unorganized
interests also prevent Congress from being the one to correct this imbalance?
Perhaps. No framework statute, including the one proposed here, en-
tirely can eliminate the incentives members of Congress have to cater to
powerful interest groups. But a framework statute can at least curb these
incentives by establishing structures that promote well-informed deliberation
and discourage rent-seeking. As Elizabeth Garrett has noted, frameworks
have proved useful in, among other things, solving collective action
problems and entrenching certain macro-objectives so that future decisions
are more likely to align with them." In fact, a number of congressional
frameworks enacted in the budget, base closure, federalism, and environ-
mental contexts suggest that legislators may welcome structural devices de-
signed to entrench public-regarding goals against encroachment by well-
organized, politically powerful groups. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example,
Congress enacted the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act ("GRH") 9 and pay-as-
you-go budget rules ("PAYGO"), 60 both of which were designed to give
preference to the interests of diffuse, unorganized groups-e.g., taxpayers
and future citizens who ultimately would foot the bill for soaring deficits-
over those of politically powerful special interests. Both GRH and PAYGO
established legislative precommitments to deficit reduction that allowed
members of Congress to tell disappointed interests, "I had no choice; budget
rules forced my hand and precluded me from giving you more." Other
prominent frameworks used to counteract collective action problems and en-
trench macro-objectives include: the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
18 See Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 295 (2006).
19 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Title II, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). GRH was a frame-
work statute that imposed an automatic sequester, cutting government spending by a fixed
percentage across several spending categories, if deficits in a given year exceeded a predeter-
mined deficit maximum. The point of the statute was to place spending authority outside the
ordinary lawmaking process, which had proved incapable of producing balanced budgets be-
cause of lawmakers' tendency to give in to interest group pressure. See, e.g., Brief of the
Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House of Representatives, Intervenors-Appel-
lants at 1, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Nos. 85-1377 to 85-1379), 1986 WL
728086 (stating that "the provision which vested the statutorily-prescribed mathematical cal-
culations of the cuts in the independent Comptroller General" was enacted "in order to 'wall'
off that accounting function from political manipulation.").
60 Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Title XIII, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573
(1994) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902). PAYGO rules require that any new tax legisla-
tion and any new spending enacted by Congress must be revenue neutral; that is, the legisla-
tion cannot cause the government to lose more money than it gains. PAYGO operates as a
check on interest group pressure for tax subsidies or spending programs because it enables/
forces legislators on the receiving end of such pressure to say no unless the pressing group can
find some way (either through a tax increase or through a spending cut elsewhere in the
budget) to pay for the expenditures it seeks.
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Act,6 which establishes a legislative precommitment to close down unneces-
sary military bases in the face of powerful home district pressure to keep
individual bases open; the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 62 ("UMRA"),
which locks in a legislative commitment to reduce the incidence and size of
federal mandates to state and local governments; the proposed Federalism
Act of 199963 ("FAA"), which sought to entrench a legislative precommit-
ment to principles of federalism by limiting federal preemption of state and
local government authority; and the National Environmental Policy Act 64
("NEPA"), through which Congress precommitted the entire federal govern-
ment to environmental awareness.
Section A of this Part briefly describes these legislative precedents, em-
phasizing the political dysfunctions they were designed to overcome and/or
the overlooked policy concerns they were crafted to highlight. Section B
outlines a proposal for a representation reinforcing framework statute, bor-
rowing significantly from the mechanics of these existing legislative
precedents.
A. Legislative Precedents
As other scholars have noted, legislative rules of procedure often oper-
ate as precommitment65 devices. These are devices enacted by legislators to
bind themselves, Ulysses-like, to a particular goal or principle and prevent
themselves (and future Congresses) from answering the Siren call of short-
term, self-interested politics.6 6 In the last few decades, such procedural
precommitments increasingly have been implemented through framework
statutes, passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President. 67
61 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, div. B,
title XXIX, pt. A, 104 Stat. 1808 (1990) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note, titled
"Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission" (2006)).
62 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006)).
63 H.R. 2245, 106th Cong. (1999).
6 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2000)).
65 Precommitment theory has a rich pedigree. Its foundational works include: JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONTEST 57 (1984); Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing
Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357 (1985); Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in
Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, Am. ECON. REV., May 1984, at 1.
6 See, e.g., Garrett, Framework Legislation, supra note 7, at 749-55 (describing precom-
mitment as one of the purposes of framework statutes implementing legislative rules); Garrett,
Harnessing Politics, supra note 7, at 513 n.43 ("[In the budget context, supermajority re-
quirements and other institutionalized structures can operate as precommitment devices to
avoid collective action problems that reduce Congress's ability to achieve preferred policy
outcomes."); Kysar, supra note 7, at 342 (internal budget rules as precommitment devices);
Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1116-18
(1998) (balanced-budget amendment as a precommitment device).
67 See Garrett, Framework Legislation, supra note 7, at 720 (describing framework stat-
utes as part of the "modem congressional change and reform" that "began with the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970); see also Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federal-
ism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2008).
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While none of these frameworks completely has erased the specter of self-
interested legislator behavior, several have proved effective at increasing
compliance with their public-regarding goals. This Section discusses the de-
sign and effect of federalism, base closure, and environmental precommit-
ments enacted in the form of framework statutes.
1. Federalism
During the latter half of the 1990s, after Republicans regained control
of both houses, Congress sought to entrench a procedural precommitment to
greater federal government respect for state and local government authority.
It attempted to do so through two framework statutes: UMRA, which be-
came law in 1995, and the FAA, which became stalled in committee and has
not, to this date, been enacted. Because the FAA remains merely a proposal
rather than an operating framework law, and because it is modeled on
UMRA, this Section focuses primarily on the provisions of UMRA.
The background concerns that motivated UMRA were similar, in many
ways, to those that motivate this Article's proposal for a representation rein-
forcing framework statute. State and local government officials were con-
cemed that federal lawmakers, who are faced with political and electoral
incentives both to enact popular federal programs and to avoid raising taxes
or incurring deficits to pay for those programs, systematically were passing
program costs on to state and local governments through unfunded man-
dates. 68 They were, at bottom, complaining about a collective action prob-
lem: Because every individual legislator wanted to take credit for enacting
popular federal programs, but no legislator was willing to take the blame for
raising taxes, too many costs were being shifted to state and local govern-
ments without analysis of whether the benefits justified the costs. 69 This is-
sue is not unlike public choice and SGRR scholars' concern that Congress's
political and electoral incentives to cater to wealthy, powerful interests and
ignore diffuse, unorganized ones has produced a surfeit of legislation
skewed towards the concerns of wealthy, powerful groups.
UMRA seeks to protect state and local interests by ensuring that legis-
lators are informed of the costs imposed on state and local governments by
federal mandates. Before UMRA was enacted,70 the Congressional Budget
Office ("CBO") was supposed to provide legislators with estimates of the
costs that state and local governments would incur in complying with federal
' See Garrett, supra note 52, at 1133-34.
69 See Evan Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1065 (1995) (discussing
accountability concerns with federal mandates); Garrett, supra note 52, at 1134.
70 The State and Local Government Cost Estimate Act of 1981 required CBO to estimate
the costs that state and local governments would incur over five years in carrying out or com-
plying with "any significant bill or resolution." State and Local Government Cost Estimate
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-108, 95 Stat. 1510, 1510.
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mandates, but in practice often did not do so7 and faced no sanction from
Congress for this failure.72 As a consequence, federal lawmakers often were
not aware that a bill on which they were voting included an unfunded man-
date-nor were they aware how much the mandate would cost state and
local governments. 73 UMRA is designed to change this dynamic by ensuring
that Congress has information about the costs of intergovernmental man-
dates before it decides whether to impose them, and by encouraging the
federal government to provide funding to cover the costs of such mandates.74
UMRA works as follows: Whenever a proposed bill contains an un-
funded mandate, the Act requires congressional committees to alert CBO,
and then requires CBO to issue a report estimating the costs of that mandate.
When the authorizing committee75 eventually reports the proposed bill out to
the full House or Senate, UMRA requires that the committee report accom-
panying the bill incorporate the estimates generated by CBO and: (1) iden-
tify and describe any federal mandates in the bill or joint resolution; (2)
provide a statement about the direct costs to state, local, and tribal govern-
ments, and to the private sector, 76 of complying with the mandates; (3) state
whether the bill provides funding to cover these costs; and (4) include a
qualitative and, if practical, a quantitative assessment of the costs and bene-
fits expected to result from the mandates (including the effects on health,
safety, and the protection of the natural environment).77 UMRA also requires
authorizing committees "promptly" to submit any bill of a "public charac-
ter" to the Director of CBO and to identify any mandates contained
"' Indeed, a CBO report indicates that during the 14-year period from 1982-1995, CBO
provided Congress with a little more than 7000 such estimates; after passage of the UMRA, by
contrast, CBO conducted 6000 estimates in just 5 years (from 1996-2000). CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, A CBO REPORT: CBO's ACTIVITIEs UNDER THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT,
1996 TO 2000, at ix, 1 (2001) [hereinafter CBO REPORT, 1996 TO 2000].
72 See, e.g., W1LLIAm N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETr, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 488 (3d
ed. 2001). Senator Sasser (D-Tenn.) described the situation pre-UMRA as follows: "The prob-
lem [with the 1981 Act], it has become clear, is that this yellow caution light has no red light
to back it up." 139 CONG. REc. S14765-06 (1993) (statement of Sen. Sasser).
7' ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 72, at 488.
74 CBO REPORT, 1996 TO 2000, supra note 71, at vii.
15 An authorizing committee is a standing committee of the House or Senate with legisla-
tive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the laws, or parts of laws, that establish or continue
the legal operations of federal programs or agencies. Authorizing committees draft "authoriz-
ing legislation," which is a necessary precursor that must be enacted before legislation actually
appropriating funds to a program can be passed.
76 UMRA has separate requirements requiring reporting by congressional committees of
mandates imposed on (1) state, local, and tribal governments ("intergovernmental mandates");
and (2) private sector entities. My discussion will be confined to UMRA's provisions concern-
ing intergovernmental mandates, as the treatment of such mandates is more analogous to that
proposed by my "Transparency in Legislation Act." Private sector mandates, for example, are
not subject to points of order. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
11 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 423, 109 Stat. 48, 53-55
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 658b) (2006).
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therein.7" Conference committees are to follow these same reporting require-
ments "to the greatest extent practicable."79
In addition to the requirements it imposes on committees, UMRA con-
tains specific directives to CBO regarding the cost estimates to be conducted
on bills or resolutions reported by the authorizing committees. 0 These cost
estimates are triggered whenever CBO estimates that the direct costs of fed-
eral mandates imposed by the bill will exceed $50 million.8' If the CBO
statement cannot be published with the committee report, the committee is
responsible for ensuring that it is published in the Congressional Record
before the bill or resolution is considered on the floor of the House or Sen-
ate. 2 At the request of any Senator, CBO must estimate the costs of any
intergovernmental mandates contained in an amendment the Senator wishes
to offer.83
UMRA generally has been viewed as a success. Since it took effect in
1996, there has been an overall decrease in the number of proposed bills
containing unfunded mandates above the statutory threshold-i.e., bills that
would be out of order under the UMRA's provisions. Thus, according to
CBO, the number of bills with mandates exceeding the UMRA threshold has
declined from eleven in 1996, the first year UMRA took effect, to an aver-
age of six over each of the next nine years.8 4 More importantly, substantial
anecdotal evidence and CBO's own observations8 5 indicate that UMRA has
" 2 U.S.C. § 658c ("Duties of the Director; Statements on Bills and Joint Resolutions
Other than Appropriations Bills and Joint Resolutions"). In practice, however, CBO typically
reviews each bill approved by a committee to identify mandates and estimate their costs. CBO
REPORT, 1996 TO 2000, supra note 71, at 3.
'9 Id. § 658c(d) ("Amended Bills and Joint Resolutions; Conference Reports").
"0 Specifically, CBO must prepare for inclusion in the committee report a detailed esti-
mate of, inter alia: (1) the total amount of the direct cost of complying with the federal inter-
governmental mandates in the bill or joint resolution; (2) the appropriations needed to fund
such authorizations for up to ten years after the mandates take effect; (3) the amount, if any, of
additional appropriations provided by the bill or joint resolution to fund the intergovernmental
mandates; and (4) if CBO cannot estimate the cost of a mandate, a statement asserting that
such an estimate is not feasible and explaining why. Id. § 658c.
s' The $50 million threshold figure is in 1996 dollars, and is to be adjusted annually for
inflation-in 2006, that adjusted threshold was $64 million. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, A CBO REPORT: A REvIEw OF CBO's ACTIVITIES IN 2006 UNDER THE UN-
FUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 1 (2007).
82 2 U.S.C. § 658b(f)(2) ("Other Publication of Statement of Director").
83 Id. § 658f ("Requests to the Congressional Budget Office from Senators").
I See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A CBO REPORT: A REvIEw OF CBO's AcTIvrrIES UNDER
THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT, 1996 TO 2005, at 4 (2006) (showing fifty-three bills
with mandates exceeding the statutory threshold from 1997 to 2005).
85 One Congressional Budget Office Report, for instance, observes the following "pat-
tern[ ] about federal mandates and their costs":
In some cases, lawmakers have altered legislative proposals to reduce the costs of
federal mandates before enacting them .... For many of those mandates-such as a
requirement that drivers' licenses show Social Security numbers, a moratorium on
certain taxes on Internet services, preemptions of state securities fees, and provisions
in the farm bill about the contents of milk-it was clear that information provided by
CBO played a role in the Congress's decision to lower the costs.
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affected Congress's deliberative processes and has altered the outcome of at
least some legislation.86 UMRA does have its limits: While the framework
has prompted Congress to scale back some statutory provisions87 or create
exceptions88 in order to bring mandate costs below the prescribed threshold,
it has not stopped Congress from enacting legislation with mandates exceed-
ing the threshold when Congress has deemed it appropriate to do so. 9
CBO REPORT, 1996 TO 2000, supra note 71, at viii.
86 One notable UMRA success involved the portion of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") initially known as the Immigration Control
and Financial Responsibility Act. Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The original com-
mittee version of the bill contained a provision requiring state driver's licenses to include
Social Security numbers by October 1, 1997, a requirement which would have resulted in a
large influx of people seeking early renewals and would have imposed direct costs on state
governments of $80-200 million in the first six years. H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. (1996). Faced
with the heightened scrutiny required by UMRA and the threat of a point of order, however,
this provision was revised by a manager's amendment that allowed states to implement the new
license requirements over an extended period of time, and thereby eliminated the influx of
renewals and reducing the direct costs to $10-$20 million over six years. See CBO REPORT,
1996 TO 2000, supra note 71, at 14-15; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 72, at 486. A manager's
amendment is one that is agreed to by both sides (parties) in advance, before a bill is consid-
ered on the floor; the "managers" are the majority and minority members who manage the
debate on a bill for their side. C-SPAN Congressional Glossary, http://www.cspan.org/guide/
congress/glossary/manamend.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
87 For example, the proposed Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, Internet Gambling Prohi-
bition Act of 1997, S. 474, 105th Cong. § 3(a) and Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999,
S. 692, 106th Cong. § 2(a), were amended, as a result of UMRA, to eliminate a $60 million
intergovernmental mandate (exempting, inter alia, state lotteries). See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
supra note 72, at 488. Similarly, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), was revised to lessen the parity requirements between
mental and physical health coverage, in order to reduce overall health insurance costs imposed
on states. See CBO REPORT, 1996 TO 2000, supra note 71, at 15.
88 Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1100, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-719
(1998), for example, was revised to allow states to continue collecting sales tax on internet
access so as to avoid cutting off a substantial source of state revenue. See CBO REPORT, 1996
TO 2000, supra note 71, at 15. Likewise, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996), was revised to limit the scope of a preemption
against state securities registration, in order to allow states to continue to collect certain fees.
See CBO REPORT, 1996 TO 2000, supra note 71, at 15.
89 In fact, during the ten-year period between 1996 and 2005, Congress enacted five stat-
utes containing unfunded intergovernmental mandates that exceeded UMRA's threshold. They
were: (1) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638 (2004) (requiring state and local governments to meet certain standards for issuing driv-
ers' licenses, identification cards, and vital-statistics documents, estimated to cost state and
local governments over $100 million over the 2005-2009 period, and authorizing partial fed-
eral funding to defray those costs); (2) Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
435, 118 Stat. 2615 (2004) (temporarily preempting state authority to tax certain Internet ser-
vices and transactions, estimated to cost state and local governments at least $300 million in
lost revenues); (3) Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (preempting state taxes on premiums for certain prescrip-
tion drug plans, estimated to cost states $70 million in lost revenues in the first year); (4)
Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-185, 112 Stat.
523 (1998) (reducing federal funding to administer the Food Stamp program, estimated to cost
states between $200-$300 million per year); and (5) Small Business Job Protect Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996) (increasing the minimum wage, estimated to cost state and
local governments, as employers, more than $1 billion during the first five years after it took
effect).
Representation Reinforcement
Perhaps even more important than the revisions that have been made to
statutes deemed by CBO to impose intergovernmental mandates exceeding
the statutory threshold, however, is the work that UMRA does behind the
scenes. Insiders report that UMRA has the most effect before a bill reaches
the floor, as drafters work to avoid its provisions. As former House Rules
Committee Chairman Gerald B. Solomon (R-N.Y.) has noted, UMRA
"changed the way that prospective legislation is drafted," ensuring that
"[a]nytime there is a markup, this [unfunded mandates issue] always
comes up."90 Thus, UMRA rarely is invoked as a formal matter-either
through points of order91 or through post-committee amendments designed
to bring federal mandates within its threshold-because it forces lawmakers
and their staffs to consider, at the drafting stage, the impact that proposed
bills would have on state and local governments. 92
In addition to focusing Congress's attention on the issue of unfunded
mandates, UMRA also has increased the flow of information between Con-
gress, CBO, and the intergovernmental lobby. CBO now consults the inter-
governmental lobby and other relevant interest groups during the early
stages of legislative drafting, often to obtain information about the impact,
including estimated costs, that federal mandates will impose on state and
local governments. Further, committee staff, "eager to avoid a floor fight
over mandates[, ]frequently touch base with CBO officials to determine
whether their legislative proposals qualify as unfunded mandates or exceed
the $50 million threshold." 93 UMRA also has made the job of state and local
governments (and their lobbyists) easier by giving them early notice of po-
tential unfunded mandates and by relaxing some of the pressure to monitor
committees closely in order to learn of laws with such mandates. 94
Like UMRA, the FAA was motivated by a concern that federal laws too
often encroach on state and local government interests without adequate dis-
closure or consideration. Whereas UMRA deals with federal costs imposed
on state and local governments through unfunded mandates, the FAA seeks
to curb federal preemption of state and local government authority. The FAA
reflects a concern that many federal statutes and agency rules effectively
preempt local government authority without expressly acknowledging this
fact. The Act thus is designed to make federal legislators and agency rule
makers aware of and accountable for their decisions to preempt state and
local laws. The FAA is modeled on UMRA and similarly requires committee
and conference reports to: (1) identify any section of a proposed bill that
expressly preempts state or local government authority; (2) identify the con-
' Allan Freedman, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: A Partial 'Contract' Success, CONG.
Q. WK.Y., Sept. 5, 1998, at 2318.
9' Id. ("The point of order has never been used in the Senate. It has been invoked as least
seven times in the House, but it has never come close to blocking a bill.").
91 See id. (citing CONG. Q., 1995 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 3-15 (1995)).
93 Id.
4 See ESKRIDGE E-r AL., supra note 72, at 513.
2009]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
stitutional basis for preemption; (3) set forth reasons for the preemption; and
(4) include a federalism impact assessment performed by the Director of
CBO.95 The Act reciprocally requires CBO to issue a report describing the
preemptive impact of the bill, including estimated costs to state and local
governments, and identifying any bill provision that establishes a condition
for receipt of funds under the program that is not related to the purposes of
the program.96 An innovative provision also announces a judicial canon of
construction to the effect that "[n]o Federal statute enacted after the effec-
tive date of this Act shall preempt ... any State or local government law...
unless the statute expressly states that such preemption is intended or unless
there is a direct conflict between such statute and a State or local law."97
2. Base Closures
Like UMRA, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act9" was
motivated by legislators' collective inability to take a particular course of
action that all, or most, members of Congress believed was in the public
interest. After World War II, and particularly after the Cold War, the United
States was left with many military bases and installations throughout the
country that it no longer needed. While Congress as a whole agreed that
numerous bases should be closed or consolidated to save federal funds, indi-
vidual legislators were unwilling to close bases in their own districts, and
congressional debates about which military bases should be closed became
extremely political, rather than focusing on objective criteria for closing par-
ticular bases. Acting against a backdrop of "repeated, unsuccessful efforts to
close military bases in a rational and timely manner," 99 Congress passed the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act, a framework statute that dele-
gates the authority to determine which bases should be closed or consoli-
dated to an independent, bipartisan commission of experts called the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission ("Commission").
Under the procedure established by the Act, the Secretary of Defense
first submits recommendations to Congress and to the Commission.' °° The
Commission then must hold public hearings and prepare a report, containing
an assessment of the Secretary's recommendations as well as the Commis-
sion's own recommendations for base closures and realignments.' 0 In mak-
ing their recommendations, the commissioners are restrained by the
following procedural rules: (1) they are given clear, published criteria for
determining which bases to close; (2) they must have GAO assess the Com-
95 Federalism Accountability Act of 1999, S. 1214, 106th Cong.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2901, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006).
99 Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 479 (1994).
100 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act §§ 2902(a)-(c)(1)(A), 2903(c)(1).
101 Id. § 2903(d)(l)-(2).
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mission's process and recommendations; and (3) they must submit their list
of proposed base closures to Congress and the President for an up-or-down
approval vote (no amendments or alterations). 102 If the President accepts the
Commission's recommendations as a package (no amendments), 03 the rec-
ommendations are submitted to Congress.' °0 Congress then may either reject
or accept the Commission's recommendations as a package-but if it wishes
to reject the recommendations, it must pass a joint resolution to stop the
recommendations from taking effect. 105 In other words, the statutory default
is that the recommendations, once approved by the President, will take ef-
fect-unless Congress affirmatively stops them from doing so. Moreover, if
Congress passes a resolution rejecting the recommendations, the President
has the power to veto the resolution-a likely outcome since any recommen-
dations coming before Congress first will have been approved by the Presi-
dent. Thus, in order to block the Commission's recommendations from going
into effect, two-thirds of the members of Congress affirmatively must op-
pose them.
Since the first iteration in 1990, Congress has enacted three base clo-
sure and realignment statutes, pursuant to which four bipartisan Defense
Base Closure and Realignment ("BRAC") Commissions have convened and
submitted recommendations to Congress and the President. Overall, the pro-
cess established by the framework has proved successful, prompting numer-
ous base closings and saving the government substantial expense:
Combined, the four BRAC commissions have recommended the closure of
125 major military facilities and 225 minor military bases and installations,
and the realignment of 145 others. 106 The resulting closures and realignments
have saved taxpayers over $16 billion through 2001, and over $6 billion in
additional savings annually. 07 The process is not, however, perfect: Mem-
bers of Congress and the President have at times interfered with the Com-
mission's recommendations to save bases for political reasons, 08 and
difficulties persist in developing accurate cost data and modeling to project
cost savings over time. But while the base closure framework has not trans-
formed politicians into nonpartisans, it has, on balance, forced them to adopt
politically unpleasant closures they would not implement on their own.
102 Id. §§ 2913(b)-(d), 2914(d).
103 Id. § 2903(e); Dalton, 511 U.S. at 470.
10' Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2903(e)(2), (e)(4).
o Id. § 2904.
'o William Hershey, Ohio Shows Unity for Bases, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2005,
at Dl.
107 John Simerman, State's Bases on the Block Again, CoTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004,
at AOl.
101 President Clinton, for example, interfered with the 1995 BRAC recommendations by
proposing that, as an alternative to shutting down bases in the electorally-rich states of Califor-
nia and Texas, private contractors should take over maintenance work at the facilities. Eric
Schmitt, House Votes to Overturn a Plan by Clinton to Save Military Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 1997, at A14.
2009]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
3. Environmental Impact Statements
Like UMRA, which was passed during a period of heightened attention
to federalism interests prompted by the Republican takeover of both houses
of Congress, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") was passed
in 1970 during a time of intensive legislative attention to environmental con-
cerns. The Act was designed to entrench environmental protection as a back-
ground concern during the formation of all regulation and legislation.
Congress believed that "[o]ne of the major factors contributing to environ-
mental abuse and deterioration is that actions-often actions having irrevers-
ible consequences-are undertaken without adequate consideration of, or
knowledge about, their impact on the environment." 109 The NEPA frame-
work seeks to solve this problem through two key provisions: (1) a broad
declaration of national environmental policy; and (2) an information-forcing
mechanism to ensure that federal policymakers are aware of the environ-
mental impact of their actions.
First, NEPA establishes a national policy calling for, among other
things, "productive harmony" between man and nature and for maintenance
of the environment for "succeeding generations."' 10 It also directs that "to
the fullest extent possible" the policies, regulations, and laws of the United
States be interpreted and administered in accordance with NEPA's environ-
mental policies."' Second, NEPA requires federal agencies, before taking
any "major Federal action," to prepare a "detailed statement" explaining the
environmental consequences of their proposed actions." 2 The statement,
known as an environmental impact statement ("EIS"), must disclose to the
public: (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action; (2) any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be im-
plemented; (3) alternatives to the proposed action; (4) the relationship be-
tween local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity; and (5) any irreversible and irre-
trievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the pro-
posed action should it be implemented.' ' The object of the EIS requirement
is to avoid uninformed agency decisions that sacrifice long-term societal in-
terests or inflict irreversible environmental damage.' 14 Regulations provide
" S. REP. No. 91-296, at 9 (1969).
11042 U.S.C. § 4331(a)-(b)(1) (2000).
11 Id. § 4332.
H2 See Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877 (1982); Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424 (1975);
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-52, 89 Stat. 258 (1975)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000)).
113 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2000).
H4 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[T]he harm at stake [in
a NEPA violation] is a harm to the environment, but the harm consists of the added risk to the
environment that takes place when governmental decision makers make up their minds without
having before them an analysis (with prior public comment) of the likely effects of their deci-
sion upon the environment. NEPA's object is to minimize.., the risk of uninformed choice.");
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that if an agency is unsure whether its proposed action is a "major Federal
action," the agency may prepare a concise "environmental assessment" to
help it determine whether an EIS is necessary. 1 5
NEPA's national policy declaration" 6 announces a regulatory precom-
mitment to the interests of two diffuse groups-future generations and the
public at large. In furtherance of this commitment, the Act's EIS requirement
seeks to ensure that federal agencies and legislators are given accurate infor-
mation regarding-and are forced to take into account the environmental
consequences of-their policy decisions. Like the mandate cost estimates in
UMRA and the preemption impact statements in the FAA, NEPA's EIS re-
quirement is designed to entrench, or secure a regulatory precommitment to,
environmental sensitivity as a routine part of the legislative process. Nota-
bly, NEPA does not require federal agencies to choose an environmentally-
friendly course over an environmentally-harmful one. But, as a practical
matter, the EIS requirement ensures that agency decisions will reflect envi-
ronmental values. As the Supreme Court has observed,
[s]imply by focusing the agency's attention on the environmental
consequences of a proposed project, NEPA ensures that important
effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discov-
ered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.
Moreover, the strong precatory language of. . . the Act and the
requirement that agencies prepare detailed impact statements inev-
itably bring pressure to bear on agencies to respond to the needs of
environmental quality. " 7
In its thirty-five year history, NEPA unquestionably has increased fed-
eral agency sensitivity to environmental concerns during the policymaking
process. Numerous proposed federal actions that would have had serious
environmental consequences have been modified, " 8 or in some cases even
see also Robert G. Dreher, NEPA Under Siege: The Political Assault on the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 2005 GEO. U. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y INST. PAPER 3.
"I See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2003) (implementing NEPA).
11642 U.S.C. § 4331.
"I Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (internal
quotes and citations omitted).
118 In 1971, for example, the Army Corps of Engineers sought to dredge the Cache River
for flood control, threatening the bottomland hardwood wetlands in the river basin on which
the woodpecker and many other species of wildlife depended. Environmentalists challenged
the adequacy of the Corps's NEPA analysis in court, pointing out that the Corps had failed to
evaluate alternatives to its dredging program that would cause less damage to wetland habitat.
The court enjoined the Corps from proceeding until it fully considered alternatives, and public
outcry over the incident led to the abandonment of the dredging project and the creation of a
national wildlife refuge. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); Dreher,
supra note 113, at 5. Other examples of NEPA's successful impact include: (1) forcing im-
provements in a land management plan that ultimately helped save the Los Alamos National
Laboratory from a potentially serious release of radiation when it was swept by wildfire in
May 2000. The laboratory's initial management plan did not address the risk of wildfire, but
other federal agencies alerted the Los Alamos staff to that risk in comments on the draft EIS.
As a result of these warnings, the laboratory had prepared a fire contingency plan, cut back
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abandoned," 9 as a result of the NEPA process.
Notably, NEPA places direct constraints on federal agencies, rather than
on legislators. Thus, its primary impact is on the administrative policymak-
ing process, rather than on the legislative process in Congress. Despite this
difference between NEPA versus UMRA, the Defense Base Closure and Re-
alignment Act, and this Article's proposed representation-reinforcing frame-
work statute, NEPA remains an important precommitment precedent for a
number of reasons. First, it shows that when the proper political conditions
exist, Congress is capable of entrenching a precommitment to protect the
interests of a diffuse interest. Second, it illustrates that a statutory require-
ment which forces the relevant policymaking entity (in NEPA's case, federal
agencies) to seek out information about the impact that its policy proposals
will have on particular interests (e.g., endangered species, future genera-
tions) can produce policy changes that reduce the harm worked on those
particular interests. To be sure, the administrative policymaking process is
different from the legislative process, which means that specific procedural
precedents are not readily transferrable from NEPA to the representation re-
inforcement context. However, the general idea behind NEPA-that federal
agencies must prepare a detailed EIS to accompany new policy proposals-
is one that can be transferred to the legislative context. Moreover, congres-
sional committees and federal agencies are at least somewhat analogous in
that both exercise gatekeeping jurisdiction/authority over legislation/regula-
tions governing particular policy areas. 20 Thus, there is at least some basis
trees and underbrush around its buildings, and taken other steps to guard against the risk of
radiation release prior to the fire; and (2) forcing a proposed freeway in Kentucky's bluegrass
region to be redesigned in order to protect historic, aesthetic, and natural values as a result of
public input and legal action during the NEPA planning process. See id. at 4-6.
"9 A few noteworthy examples include: (1) saving the Department of Energy from build-
ing expensive new nuclear reactors at its Savannah River site, because the EIS requirement
enabled DOE to evaluate alternative technologies, including using a particle accelerator or
existing commercial reactors, to replace its obsolete existing reactors. Admiral James Watkins,
then Secretary of Energy, testified before the House Armed Services Committee: "Looking
back on it, thank God for NEPA because there were so many pressures to make a selection for
a technology that it might have been forced upon us and that would have been wrong for the
country." Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 - H.R. 5006,
and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services,
102d Cong. 912 (1992); (2) saving wild Atlantic salmon populations in the Penobscot River
from construction of a major new hydropower dam because the EIS showed that the proposed
Basin Mills Dam would undermine long-standing federal, state, and tribal efforts to restore
wild Atlantic salmon populations to the Penobscot River. The FERC received strong com-
ments opposing the project from federal and state fishery managers and the Penobscot Indian
Nation, among others, and concluded that the public interest was best served by denial of the
license. See Dreher, supra note 114, at 4-6; and (3) forcing the state highway agency to aban-
don a proposal for a new four-lane freeway that would have worked significant wetland loss
and cost taxpayers $1.5 billion, in favor of an alternative plan, raised as a result of the EIS
requirement, that called for expanding and improving an existing highway. See id.
120 Congress divides its legislative, oversight, and internal administrative tasks among ap-
proximately two-hundred committees and subcommittees. Within assigned areas, these func-
tional subunits gather information; compare and evaluate legislative alternatives; identify
policy problems and propose solutions; select, determine, and report measures for full chamber
consideration; monitor executive branch performance (oversight); and investigate allegations
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for analogizing between a framework designed to force agency rulemakers
to gather information about the environmental impact of their proposed reg-
ulations, and a framework designed to force congressional committees to
gather information about the impact that committee proposals would have on
politically-disadvantaged groups.
B. Proposal: A "Transparency in Legislation Act"
Like the legislative frameworks discussed in the previous Section, the
representation reinforcing framework statute proposed below would seek to
solve a collective action problem, entrench a macro-objective (or legislative
precommitment), and address informational deficiencies in the legislative
process. The collective action problem in this context arises from the fact
that members of Congress have no electoral incentive to pay attention to the
costs or harms that a legislative proposal will impose on politically weak
groups-particularly not when a powerful group stands to benefit from the
proposal. Thus, even if legislators might wish, for moral or policy reasons, to
be sensitive to the interests of indigent criminal defendants, consumers, or
future taxpayers, they may perceive little to no gain from pushing to protect
those groups' interests. Further, legislators may not always be aware that a
bill will harm or impose costs on a particular group. Politically diffuse or
weak groups are not likely to be on legislators' radar screens or be able to
bring themselves to legislators' attention and accordingly may become unin-
tended casualties of many bills. This is especially true in the present era of
omnibus legislation. The framework proposed in this Article thus primarily
seeks to ensure that Congress receives information about the costs that a
proposed bill would impose on diffuse, underrepresented groups before it
decides whether to vote for the bill, and thereby to encourage Congress more
efficiently to balance the harms and benefits worked by the legislation it
enacts. A representation reinforcing framework statute would seek to en-
trench a legislative precommitment to consider the impact that proposed leg-
islation will have on such groups as a mandatory part of the legislative
process, much as UMRA entrenches a precommitment to consider the costs
to states of unfunded federal mandates, and as NEPA entrenches a precom-
mitment to consider the environmental impact of proposed federal actions.
1. A "Red Flag" List
The goal of a representation reinforcing framework statute should be to
make statutory tradeoffs clear both to Congress and to the public and,
thereby, to give Congress strong incentives to make better distributive
choices. Thus, whereas the second-generation representation reinforcers at-
of wrongdoing. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CoMMrrE TYPES AND ROLES (2003). For more on
the role of administrative agencies, see, for example, ESKRIDoE ET AL., supra note 72, at
1118-26.
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tempt to use the judicial branch to hack away at congressionally-enacted
interest group gains and to impose transparency requirements that shame
Congress into behaving better, this Article's proposed framework would
place greater emphasis on giving Congress the tools it needs to deliberate
more effectively and to police its own behavior towards underrepresented
groups in the first instance.
To this end, one key step in the proposed framework statute should be
the establishment of a list of "Red Flag" groups to whom Congress commits
to give greater voice in the future. "Red Flag" groups should be defined to
mean societal groups who are diffuse, politically unorganized, and whose
interests traditionally have gone overlooked in the legislative process. Once
a list of specific "Red Flag" groups has been established, it should be made
a defined statutory feature that sets the baseline for what triggers the statute's
other requirements.
Because creation of a list of groups to be given extra consideration in
the legislative process is likely to become partisan, and, if performed by
Congress, susceptible to the very political dysfunctions the framework seeks
to counteract, the framework should require that Congress establish an inde-
pendent, bipartisan commission-similar to that established by the Base
Closure Act-to be charged with deciding which groups should be placed on
the "Red Flag" list. To ensure the independence and bipartisanship of the
commission, the statute should prescribe a politically balanced procedure for
selecting the commission's members. The Defense Base Closure and Re-
alignment Act, for example, directs that the nine members of the base clo-
sure commission be nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, and requires the President, in selecting nominees, to consult with and
take recommendations from the Speaker of the House and the Senate major-
ity leader for the appointment of two members each, and with the minority
leaders of the House and the Senate for the appointment of one member
each. "' The remaining three nominees are left to the President's discretion.
The same or similar rules should be used to govern selection of the members
of a representation reinforcement commission.
As in the base closure context, the framework statute should set out
baseline criteria that a group must meet in order to be placed on the list. A
few possibilities include: (1) the group should have a large membership (a
threshold size could be established); and (2) the group should face structural
impediments to organization-such as low financial resources, lack of exis-
tence at the time legislation is passed (as with tort victims, who do not be-
come members of a group until they are injured, or future taxpayers, who are
not necessarily born at the time the statute is enacted). Paradigmatic groups
who should be considered for list status would include legal aliens, indigent
121 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510,
Div. B, title XXIX, pt. A, § 2902(c)(2), 104 Stat. 1808 (1990) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. §2687 note on Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (2006)).
[Vol. 46
Representation Reinforcement
defendants, future taxpayers, those living below the poverty line, and per-
haps consumers. In addition, the baseline criteria dictated by the framework
statute should make clear that groups that already have a vocal lobby in
place (e.g., the NAACP, NOW, and the AARP) cannot be designated as
"Red Flag" groups by the independent commission. Finally, the framework
should limit the total number of groups that can be given "Red Flag" status,
in order to keep compliance with the statute's prescriptions feasible and to
guard against establishment of an unwieldy, overly-inclusive list.
Once the independent commission has compiled a list of "Red Flag"
groups, the list should be submitted to Congress and the President for an up-
or-down vote approving or disapproving it. As with the Base Closure Com-
mission's recommendations, the statutory default should be that the commis-
sion's list automatically is deemed adopted, unless Congress affirmatively
votes to disapprove it. This procedural mechanism would shift the burden of
inertia and political foot-dragging in favor of the framework.
Congressional adoption of such a list of "Red Flag" groups would be
far preferable to ad hoc judicial determination of groups' relative political
power for a number of reasons. Significantly, inclusion on the "Red Flag
List" would ensure only that additional attention will be paid to the impact
that legislative proposals will have on the group. It would not provide an
automatic guarantee that the group will win or lose the benefit of the doubt
in statutory interpretation against other groups who are politically weaker or
stronger-unlike judicial invocation of representation reinforcing canons of
construction, which would place an automatic thumb on the scales in favor
of the weaker political group. Further, if a list of "Red Flag" groups is es-
tablished as part of a framework statute, then it will be a stable list that
applies uniformly across all statutes, rather than an ad hoc one that shifts
with the whims of the different judges and courts who come to apply it. This
is not to say that a statutory list would be permanent or unchangeable; Con-
gress could and should appoint subsequent commissions to review and up-
date the List periodically. But changes to the List would have to take a
formal route, and be subject to popular input and electoral accountability,
rather than be imposed from on high by the politically isolated judiciary.
2. Information-Forcing Mechanisms
The second key aspect of a representation reinforcing framework stat-
ute should be a requirement that any bill that appears likely to affect a "Red
Flag" group adversely, or to benefit a narrow interest while imposing costs
on a "Red Flag" group, must be accompanied by an impact report conducted
by an independent entity such as CBO or the GAO. Further, such an impact
report must be made available to members of Congress before they vote on
the bill. Borrowing from the UMRA, NEPA, and FAA models, the proposed
framework should require all congressional committees: (1) to submit to
CBO/GAO any bill or joint resolution that seems likely to impose costs, but
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not corresponding benefits, on an under-represented "Red Flag" group; and
(2) to identify specifically in an "interest impact" statement the "Red Flag"
group(s) on whom the costs are being imposed, as well as the group(s)
whom the bill is designed to benefit. The statute also should require commit-
tees to identify the groups who lobbied for and against the bill or resolution,
both as a proxy for which groups are expected to be harmed or to benefit and
as a crude indicator of groups' political participation in the drafting process.
In addition, the statute should direct CBO/GAO to review bills reported out
of committee for adverse effects on "Red Flag" groups-formalizing the
process that takes place in practice in the UMRA context. This would force
congressional committees to give at least some thought to the consequences
that bills and resolutions will have for under-represented groups at the draft-
ing stage, as well as provide a back-up check to keep committees honest and
catch inadvertent reporting errors. Finally, the statute would allow, and even
encourage, congressional committees to state whether ambiguities in the
statute should be construed to favor or disfavor certain specified groups or
interests.
Once a committee has submitted a legislative proposal and "interest
impact" statement to CBO/GAO, that entity then should be required to pre-
pare an impact report evaluating: (1) the impact in qualitative and, if possi-
ble, quantitative terms, that the bill is expected to have on List groups; and
(2) the benefits the bill is expected to confer on other groups. Again, the
point of the impact report requirement is to force Congress to take into ac-
count the effect that proposed legislation or statutory language will have on
groups whose concerns often get passed over in the lawmaking process. The
report is meant to provide information, as well as promote deliberation. This
is significant because, as Jonathan Macey has highlighted, one of the ways in
which powerful, well-organized interests impose their will on the legislative
process is by controlling the flow of information to legislators-often dis-
torting the picture so that legislators believe they are enacting a statute
which benefits the public when they actually are passing special interest leg-
islation. 22 Mandatory impact reports conducted by CBO, GAO, or some
other neutral entity might shed light on such distortions, or help legislators
understand who will be the true beneficiaries and victims of proposed
legislation.
The critical feature of both UMRA and NEPA is that both statutes em-
phasize early analysis by CBO and federal agencies, and inclusion of CBO's
and federal agencies' estimates, in a report or impact statement that accom-
panies the relevant proposal. This ensures that individual legislators in the
case of UMRA, and agency lawmakers in the case of NEPA, are made aware
of the effect that a proposed law or federal action will have on state and local
governments or the environment while they are contemplating the proposal,
and before they decide how to vote. Moreover, both statutes dictate several
122 See Macey, supra note 5, at 254.
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specific cost and impact assessments that must be included in the report or
impact statement, to ensure that legislators and agency lawmakers have as
much relevant information as possible when deciding whether to vote to
approve a particular proposal. These provisions promote informed delibera-
tion by Congress and federal agencies, and provide some measure of assur-
ance that local government and environmental concerns will not get swept
under the rug during the oft-rushed lawmaking process.
Following this model, the proposed "Transparency in Legislation Act"
would require the "interest impact reports" generated by CBO/GAO to ac-
company the bills or resolutions they analyze and to be presented to the full
congressional membership at the same time as such bills or resolutions-or
where that is not possible, to be published in the Congressional Record
before the vote on such bills or resolutions. Further, it would require that the
CR0/GAO report contain a qualitative and, if possible, a quantitative analy-
sis of the relative costs and benefits that the bill or resolution would impose
on different interests, with special emphasis on costs and benefits to "Red
Flag" groups. In using neutral CBO or GAO number-crunchers to conduct
the empirical work, the framework statute would come as close as possible
to ensuring that the impact reports upon which legislators rely are fair and
accurate, a guarantee sorely lacking in the current scheme in which politi-
cally powerful groups often are the only ones presenting impact reports to
legislators. 23 Finally, in order to guard against last-minute circumvention of
this information-forcing mechanism, the statute would follow the UMRA
model of requiring conference committee reports to include CR0/GAO re-
ports reflecting any changes made in conference, and would allow any mem-
ber of Congress to request CBO/GAO analysis of the consequences of
proposed amendments, to be submitted prior to the vote on the amendment.
The framework proposed in this Article thus advocates, in essence, a
"danger signals" approach for the legislative process. In administrative law,
the "danger signals" or "hard look" doctrine directs courts to be alert to
"signals" indicating a lack of careful decision-making by an agency, and to
give extra scrutiny, or a "hard look," to regulations that appear to be the
result of a careless decision-making process.124 Under this Article's proposal,
the "danger signal" would be flashed by Congress itself, through the "List
of Red Flag Groups"-and the "hard look" would be provided both by the
impact report and by courts upon later review. That is, a group's inclusion on
the List would act as a danger signal indicating that the group's concerns are
likely to be overlooked in the legislative process. Anytime a bill, conference
123 See, e.g., supra note 114 and accompanying text. CBO is well-respected as a relatively
independent part of the congressional structure, and its estimates are considered reliable and
thorough. See Garrett, supra note 52, at 1149 (citing MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Discussion
with William Beach, Economist at the Heritage Foundation, and Robert Reischauer, Senior
Fellow at Brookings Institution (PBS television broadcast Dec. 12, 1995); Playing Games with
CBO, WASH. POST., Jan. 31, 1988, at D6.
124 See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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report, or amendment that would affect the group is reported out, an impact
report would be generated in an effort to ensure that Congress deliberates
thoroughly about the impact that proposed legislation is likely to have on the
group (a "hard look"). As a further check, if Congress were to choose, even
after considering the impact report, to enact a statute that disadvantages a
"Red Flag" group, courts later reviewing that statute would provide a sec-
ond "hard look," by searching the record for evidence that Congress con-
sulted with members of the disadvantaged group while deliberating on the
bill. 125 This Article's proposal would differ slightly from the traditional dan-
ger signals approach in that courts no longer would have to read tealeaves to
discern danger signals-instead, (1) Congress, through the independent
commission, would identify ex ante the groups most likely to suffer under-
representation; (2) Congress itself would seek to ensure that those groups'
concerns are given a "hard look" during the legislative process; and (3) the
judiciary would give statutes that adversely affect List groups a follow-up
"hard look" to confirm that the groups were consulted while the statutes
were being drafted and enacted.
3. A Point of Order Trigger
UMRA usefully establishes a $50 million threshold for intergovern-
mental mandates,' 26 exempting mandates that impose costs below the thresh-
old from detailed CBO review and subjecting mandates that impose costs
above the threshold to both detailed CBO review and a presumption of inva-
lidity, enforceable by a parliamentary point of order. 27 This rule has several
advantages. Most notably, it keeps UMRA manageable by sparing CBO
from conducting detailed estimates for smaller mandates and thereby ena-
bling CBO-and Congress-to focus its attention on identifying the most
egregious instances in which proposed bills seek to impose unfunded man-
dates on state and local governments. Further, the rule reflects a recognition
that UMRA cannot-and should not necessarily-eliminate all intergovern-
mental mandates, and sets up a de facto acceptable level of unfunded man-
dates that Congress may impose without significant procedural resistance.
Congress is free to enact federal mandates that impose less than $50 million
in direct costs on state and local governments, without providing offsetting
funds to affected states or localities, so long as the relevant committee report
acknowledges that an unfunded mandate is being enacted.
125 See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
'
26 See 2 U.S.C. § 658c(a)(1) (2006).
127 Compare id. § 658c(a)(l)-(2) (describing estimates required for bills or resolutions
that exceed the $50 million threshold), and id. § 658d (making out of order proposed bills, etc.
that would impose intergovernmental mandates above the threshold specified in § 658c(a)(1)),
with id. § 658c(c) (requiring only a brief explanation of the basis for the cost estimate for bills
that impose mandates below the $50 million threshold). For a fuller discussion of how the
point of order works, see infra Section El.B.2.
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Borrowing from this model, this Article recommends that a representa-
tion reinforcing framework also should establish a threshold below which
statutes imposing costs on "Red Flag" groups would not trigger detailed
CBO/GAO analysis, and above which a statute imposing costs presump-
tively would be out of order. There are a few different options for how the
trigger could be defined. One option would be to emulate the $50 million
UMRA trigger by identifying a specific dollar figure as the maximum ac-
ceptable cost that legislative proposals can impose on a "Red Flag" group.
So, for example, the framework might dictate that any bill which "would
impose more than $10 million or $20 million in costs on a 'Red Flag' group"
is out of order. If Congress wished to enact a proposal that would impose
costs above this threshold on a "Red Flag" group, it would have to vote
affirmatively to waive the point of order.
Other options for a threshold that should trigger review under a repre-
sentation reinforcing framework statute include: (1) the ratio between ex-
pected costs to "Red Flag" groups versus expected benefits to narrow
interests, with a low ratio resulting in no review even for bills whose sole
purpose is to transfer wealth to narrow interests; (2) the ratio between the
estimated number of citizens who will bear the costs of or be harmed by the
bill versus the estimated number of citizens who will benefit from the bill,
again with a low ratio triggering no review no matter how rent-seeking the
purpose of the bill; or, more simply, (3) an automatic presumption that any
bill that benefits fewer than, say, 100 people or harms more than, say, 5,000
people, is likely to redistribute wealth from a diffuse, underrepresented
group and should trigger review. This last trigger-threshold is modeled on
one used in the now-defunct Line Item Veto Act, which empowered the Joint
Tax Committee to subject any tax provision benefiting 100 or fewer taxpay-
ers to presidential cancellation.1 28
In fact, the ideal threshold for CBO/GAO review may be one that com-
bines all three of these measures. Ultimately, whatever measure is chosen
should provide that bills in which those who benefit also pay most of the
costs and in which the costs are roughly commensurate with the benefits (or
the benefits exceed the costs) would not trigger CBO/GAO review, though
the committee reporting out the bills should be required to identify the bene-
fiting group(s) as well as identify who lobbied for and against the bill.
Once such a threshold has been established, the representation reinforc-
ing statute, like UMRA, should be enforced through a parliamentary proce-
dure called a "point of order."' 29 The UMRA point of order operates as
follows: Any bill reported out of committee that contains a federal mandate
but is not accompanied by a CBO cost statement is deemed "out of order;"
likewise any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report
12' Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200, invalidated by Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
129 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 658d.
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that includes an intergovernmental mandate exceeding $50 million is
deemed "out of order" unless Congress has provided federal funding to
cover the costs of complying with the mandate. 130 The point of order is not
self-enforcing; it does not automatically invalidate any piece of legislation.
Rather, it empowers individual legislators to object to legislative proposals
that violate the UMRA's provisions. Thus, if a bill or resolution reported out
of committee imposes intergovernmental mandates costing more than $50
million or is not accompanied by a CBO cost statement, any legislator in
either chamber may raise a point of order against it on the chamber floor.
Once a point of order has been raised, brief debate (20 minutes total) is had
and then the full chamber votes on whether to waive the point of order for
the particular bill or resolution. 131 In other words, the point of order does not
make it impossible for Congress to circumvent UMRA's requirements-but
it does make such circumventions transparent, by requiring deliberations and
a recorded vote on the decision to waive a point of order.
Points of order are a common enforcement mechanism in the budget
process. They are, for example, used to ensure committee compliance with
the spending and revenue targets set forth in the annual budget resolution'32
and to prevent use of the streamlined "reconciliation" procedure to enact
"extraneous" or "non-germane" statutory provisions. "3 Points of order
strike an admirable balance between encouraging compliance with a frame-
work statute's procedural requirements and maintaining legislative flexibil-
ity. On the one hand, the point of order empowers a single dissenting
legislator to hold Congress's feet to the fire if it chooses to evade the
UMRA's rule that the federal government must pay for any mandate over
$50 million or tries to sneak non-germane amendments into a reconciliation
bill; indeed, a recorded vote on whether to waive the point of order increases
legislators' public accountability 134 for decisions to impose unfunded man-
dates on state and local governments or to sneak "pork" into a reconciliation
bill, and thus provides a powerful legislative incentive to comply with the
original framework requirement. At the same time, Congress retains the
power, by simple majority vote, to waive the point of order with respect to a
particular federal mandate or reconciliation bill.
A representation reinforcing framework statute could adopt a similar
flexible point-of-order enforcement mechanism: First, as under UMRA, any
bill or resolution that imposes costs on a "Red Flag" group and is reported
130 Id. § 658d(a)(1), (2).
'31 See, e.g., Parliamentary Outreach Program, House Rules Comm., The Unfunded Man-
date Point of Order, PARLIAMENTARY OUTREACH PROGRAM NEWSL., June 18, 1999, http://
www.rules.house.gov/POP/pop1O6_11 .htm.
'132 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 305(d), 88 Stat. 297, 311
(1994) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 636(d)(2) (2006)).
33 See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 20001, 100 Stat. 390, 390-91 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 644(a) (2006)).
134 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 72, at 513-14.
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out of committee without a CBO/GAO "impact report" should be deemed
"out of order." This would enforce the statute's information-forcing mecha-
nism. Second, any bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report
that violates the threshold established in the statute-i.e., that imposes a
high ratio of costs on "Red Flag" groups versus benefits on other groups or
has a high ratio of number of persons who will bear costs versus number of
persons who will benefit-should be deemed "out of order." Such a rule
would enable individual legislators sympathetic to an under-represented
group's concerns to disaggregate the parts of a large omnibus bill, shine sun-
light on specific provisions that burden the under-represented group, and
force such a provision to survive a separate, recorded vote highlighting each
legislator's position. As under UMRA and other budget frameworks, the
point of order mechanism would enable Congress to enact statutes that harm
"Red Flag" groups if it wants to, but would require it to be transparent about
doing so. Put another way, it would establish a framework, or baseline, pre-
sumption of invalidity against statutes that harm "Red Flag" groups, invo-
cable by a single dissenting legislator, but would allow a majority of
Congress to waive the presumption in appropriate cases.
In other words, the proposed framework would create an information-
plus, or a disclosure-plus, regime. It would go further than NEPA's disclo-
sure-only regime by creating a statutory presumption against the validity of
legislation that is revealed disproportionately to harm or impose costs on
"Red Flag" groups, without corresponding benefits to those groups. But it
would not bind Congress's hands irrevocably, given the availability of the
point of order waiver.
4. Expected Results
Like NEPA and UMRA, the representation reinforcement statute pro-
posed in this Article should operate to focus greater legislative attention on
the interests of "Red Flag" groups. The very fact that impact reports are
required and that they must accompany any bill adversely affecting a "Red
Flag" group should induce legislators to pay attention to the impact that a
bill will have on "Red Flag" groups from the outset, when first drafting
statutory language. Congressional committees are likely to consult with
CBO/GAO early and often to assess the impact that their proposals will have
on List groups, in order to avoid crafting legislation that runs afoul of the
ratio threshold and becomes subject to a point of order. The impact report
requirement thus should function to inject consideration of a statute's impact
on disadvantaged groups not only into floor deliberations but also into the
initial, committee stage of the legislative process-a stage at which only
politically powerful groups traditionally have been positioned (i.e., had the
clout) to raise concerns, minimize, reshape, and even derail legislation unfa-
vorable to their interests.
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Further, committee members and CBO/GAO analysts are likely to look
to representatives of the "Red Flag" groups early in the legislative process
to provide information to help CBO/GAO conduct its impact assessment.
This raises an important question: If a group is underrepresented enough to
qualify for the List-e.g., criminal defendants, legal aliens-then to whom
will congressional committees and CBO/GAO turn if and when they decide
to take these groups' concerns into account? There are at least three possibili-
ties. First, while most "Red Flag" groups will lack an organization or re-
sources for responding to committee or CBO/GAO contacts, surrogate
organizations such as Public Citizen, Common Cause, the ACLU, the Con-
cord Coalition, and others whose mission is to represent the interests of
groups that lack political power, 135 may be able to step in and represent these
groups' interests during the legislation-drafting stage. Second, some "Red
Flag" groups may be organized, but lack political power for other reasons
(e.g., Native Americans). Such groups should be galvanized by a representa-
tion reinforcing framework that gives them early notice of bills affecting
their interests, enabling them to use their resources more effectively. Third,
some underrepresented, diffuse groups actually may organize, if only
loosely, as a result of the new framework, in order to take advantage of
increased congressional attention to their concerns.
Finally, the greater transparency created by the impact report-a public
document that must accompany all legislation reported out of committee-
should increase media and voter awareness about the consequences of the
laws passed by elected officials. This increased public awareness, in turn,
should operate as a check on legislators and encourage them to heed the
interests of diffuse groups by increasing the political costs of passing rent-
seeking legislation. Moreover, the point of order mechanism should increase
the political costs of enacting legislation that places disproportionate costs or
harms on "Red Flag" groups by forcing individual members of Congress to
take a recorded, public vote to waive the statute's presumptive protection of
such groups.
This is not to suggest that the framework should be expected to cure all
legislative tendencies to favor powerful groups over weaker ones. The repre-
sentation reinforcement context lesson to be learned from NEPA and UMRA
is that an information-forcing framework statute cannot, and should not, be
expected to eliminate entirely the problem upon which it is designed to focus
greater attention. Just as UMRA does not prevent the enactment of all un-
' See, e.g., Mission Statement for the ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/about/index.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2008) (describing organization's mission, in part, as seeking to "extend rights
to segments of our population that have traditionally been denied their rights"); Public Citizen,
http://www.citizen.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) (describing organization's purpose as
"represent[ing] consumer interests in Congress, the executive branch and the courts"); Com-
mon Cause, http://www.commoncause.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) (describing organization
as "a vehicle for citizens to make their voices heard in the political process"); Concord Coali-
tion, http://www.concordcoalition.org/about-us (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) (describing organi-
zation as devoted to advocating "responsible fiscal policy" on behalf of future generations).
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funded intergovernmental mandates and NEPA does not prevent the adop-
tion of environmentally harmful federal action, the statute proposed in this
paper cannot be expected to preclude Congress from passing any legislation
harmful to the interests of under-represented groups. But while complete
eradication of the problematic category of legislation is an unrealistic goal
for a framework statute, the new framework can be expected to produce a
reduction in the scope or magnitude of offending legislation enacted within
its parameters. If UMRA's $50 million threshold can lead to immigration
law changes that save state governments between $60 and $190 million, and
NEPA's EIS requirement can lead to the abandonment of a hydropower dam
project that would have destroyed the habitat of wild Atlantic salmon, 3 6 then
perhaps the parameters (e.g., ratios) set by a representation reinforcing
framework can be expected to reduce, as opposed to eliminate, the harm
imposed on Red Flag groups. Perhaps what we can expect to see is a reduc-
tion in the imbalance between costs imposed on under-represented groups
versus benefits incurred by private interests, adjustments ensuring that a
larger number of citizens reap the benefits of a statute, or modifications low-
ering the absolute costs imposed on an under-represented group. Indeed, the
UMRA-inspired amendments to mandate-imposing legislation and the modi-
fications that have been made pursuant to NEPA's EIS requirement illustrate
that when the costs to a particular entity-whether state and local govern-
ments or the environment-are highlighted, Congress and federal agencies
often can and will find ways to reduce those costs by scaling back otherwise
blanket provisions, or by creating an appropriate exception.
Consider the following examples of how a representation reinforcing
framework might work:
1. Suppose that, under pay-as-you-go budget rules, Congress were con-
templating tax legislation which would grant tax credits to oil companies and
pay for the revenue loss through an increase in cigarette taxes. Suppose also
that persons living below the poverty line were a designated group on the
"Red Flag" list. If the impact report issued by the CBO/GAO revealed that
the costs of the cigarette tax increase would be borne primarily by persons
living below the poverty line, while the benefits disproportionately would be
reaped by non-"Red Flag" oil companies, then a point of order presump-
tively would lie against the legislation. This would mean that Congress could
not enact the tax cut for oil companies paid for by a tax increase (effectively)
on persons living below the poverty line, unless members of Congress were
willing to take a public, recorded vote to waive the presumptive protection
for persons living below the poverty line. Alternatively, the information re-
vealed in the impact report might lead Congress to tweak the proposal to pay
for the oil company tax cut with a consumption tax on luxury cars, ships,
and jewelry, rather than cigarettes.
136 See supra note 119.
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2. Suppose that Congress were contemplating legislation that would cut
Medicaid spending and direct the Treasury Secretary to use the savings to
pay down the national debt. Suppose further that both persons living below
the poverty line and future taxpayers were designated "Red Flag" groups. If
the impact report showed that the proposed legislation would benefit future
taxpayers and impose costs on persons living below the poverty line, pitting
"Red Flag" group against "Red Flag" group, the point of order mechanism
would not be triggered, and Congress would be free to enact or not enact the
legislation, absent procedural constraint.
3. Suppose that Congress were considering legislation which proposed
a $5,000 tuition credit for college students who agree to spend one year post-
graduation engaging in some form of national service. Suppose again that
future taxpayers were a designated "Red Flag" group. If the impact report
revealed that the proposal would cost taxpayers an amount below the de
minimis threshold that triggers the point of order, then the tuition credit leg-
islation would face no impediments. However, if the impact report revealed
that the proposal would cost taxpayers an amount greater than the point of
order trigger threshold, and would benefit a non-"Red Flag" group (i.e., the
small subset of individuals who choose to engage in national service), then a
point of order would lie against the proposed legislation. Again, this would
mean that members of Congress would have to take a recorded, public vote
to waive the presumptive protection for future taxpayers in order to enact the
tuition tax credit legislation. Alternatively, Congress might be inspired to
make the tuition tax credit available only to college students who fall below
a certain income bracket, or otherwise to limit the scope and cost of the
credit to avoid the point of order trigger.
5. Reasons Congress Might Pass a Representation Reinforcing
Framework Statute
Public disenchantment with elected officials has been at the high end of
the spectrum for the past few years. Even leaving aside the Abramoff lobby-
ing scandal,'37 a 2006 public opinion poll taken by NBC and the Wall Street
Journal showed that a thirty-nine percent plurality thought the prevention of
Congressional members from directing federal funding to benefit only cer-
tain constituents was the most important issue for Congress to accomplish
' Jack Abramoff is a former lobbyist who pled guilty in 2006 to three felony counts
related to the defrauding of American Indian tribes and corruption of prominent public offi-
cials. See Abramoff Pleads Guilty, Will Help in Corruption Probe, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERV.
(Jan. 3, 2006). In 2008, Abramoff was found guilty of trading expensive gifts, meals, and
sports trips in exchange for political favors. See Wilber Del Quentin & Carrie Johnson,
Abramoff Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison for Corruption, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2008, at A03.
Abramoff s lobbying activities became the subject of significant news coverage and public
outrage, and prompted an extensive corruption investigation that in turn led to the conviction
of White House officials J. Steven Griles and David Safavian, U.S. Representative Bob Ney
(R-OH), and nine other lobbyists and Congressional aides.
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that year. 3 s Public opinion, one of the most significant factors in inspiring
Congress to enact framework legislation, 3 9 thus supports some kind of pro-
cedural change designed to shift the balance of congressional attention from
powerful constituents to less powerful ones. While recently enacted earmark
reform' 4° goes part of the way towards addressing this public concern, it
deals with only one component of the equation and easily can be circum-
vented. In order truly to address the public's concerns, systemic legislation
focusing not just on disincentivizing Congress from enacting statutes bene-
fiting narrow interests, but also on encouraging Congress to pay attention to
the interests of the diffuse public and other less powerful interests, is needed.
But why would Congress (and the President, whose signature is re-
quired for framework legislation), want to refocus its attention in this man-
ner? Most members of Congress have one or two diffuse groups whose
causes they believe in and to whose interests they believe the legislative
process pays insufficient attention. Presidents and Presidential candidates
likewise have particular groups who are close to their hearts ideologically
and whose interests they hope to champion while in office. At least some
empirical evidence supports the notion that ideology and a desire to make
good policy play a far more significant role in determining legislators' voting
behavior than public choice theory gives them credit for. 141 While different
legislators and Presidents undoubtedly will have different ideologies and un-
derstandings of which groups should be placed on a "Red Flag" list of the
kind proposed in this Article, all are likely to agree that there are important
groups who belong on such a list and who deserve a legislative precommit-
ment to calculate and weigh the costs that proposed legislation will impose
upon them. Thus, lawmakers should be able to agree to the concept of the
proposed framework, if not necessarily to the makeup of the "Red Flag" list.
Indeed, the prospect of entrenching a procedural commitment to pay
special attention to the legislative impact on a group close to his or her heart
should be particularly enticing to the President, who knows that his or her
time in office will be limited and who may be eager to leave behind proce-
dural protections for certain groups when he or she steps down. In fact, the
requirement that the President approve the commission's list before it can
' NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL, STUDY #6062, QUESTION 15 (2006), http://on-
line.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/po120060426.pdf.
139 See Garrett, Framework Legislation, supra note 7, at 752 (observing that "frameworks
are often a response to public outcry when some focusing event or policy entrepreneur brings
the voters' attention to a problem with long-term consequences"); id. at 726 & n.29 (noting, for
example, that Congress changed a particular feature of the Congressional Pay Framework in
response to public outcry).
"4 See H. Res. 6, §404, 110th Cong. (2007) (adopting changes to internal House Rules
designed to combat earmarks); Pub. L. 110-81, § 521, 121 Stat. 735, 760 (2007) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 1601 note) (2007)) (adopting changes to Senate Rules designed to combat earmarks).
141 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEx. L. REV. 873, 889-90, 897-900 (1987); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66-68 (1990).
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take effect gives the President extra leverage to ensure that his or her most
preferred groups make it onto the List-which in turn should give the Presi-
dent an incentive to act as a policy entrepreneur and champion passage of
the proposed framework.
Individual members of Congress, of course, cannot be so certain that
their preferred groups will make it onto the commission's "Red Flag" list.
But they can be assured of an opportunity to make a case to the commission
to include their preferred groups. Further, there are some benefits, from Con-
gressmembers' perspective, to this selection process: Because a bipartisan,
independent commission, rather than Congress and the President, would de-
cide what groups should be placed on the list, legislators would not have to
worry that the list could be hijacked by their ideological opponents; mem-
bers could also take ultimate comfort in their power to disapprove the com-
mission's list if the commission gets it horribly wrong; finally, because the
consequence of putting a group on the list would be only heightened atten-
tion to the impact that proposed legislation will have on the group-not a
promise to give the group whatever it asks for-lawmakers are likely to
perceive little downside to establishment of such a framework.
6. Potential Challenges
A representation reinforcing framework statute undoubtedly would face
a number of administrative and constitutional challenges. One criticism
likely to be leveled against such a framework is that the impact report re-
quirement would bog down the legislative process, increasing, perhaps pro-
hibitively, the time and expense required to enact new laws. Such concerns,
while understandable, are overblown. If, as I have suggested, the framework
limits the total number of "Red Flag" groups, then the associated costs and
time necessary to compile the impact report accordingly would be limited.
Further, CBO and GAO are already extant entities with extant staff and al-
ready are charged with evaluating information of the kind required in the
impact report. Thus, while the framework would increase their duties and
require some additional expense, it does not require starting from scratch.
Moreover, as both the UMRA and NEPA precedents have demonstrated,
much of the information required for the impact report can be gathered by
the CBO/GAO from outside entities such as think tanks and surrogate orga-
nizations whose mission is to protect the interests of "Red Flag" groups,
reducing the work that CBO/GAO staff would have to perform.
It also is possible that, if enacted, a representation reinforcing frame-
work statute would face an Equal Protection Clause challenge on the ground
that it gives "Red Flag" groups certain rights not enjoyed by the rest of the
citizenry. Such a challenge would be misguided and unlikely to succeed for
a number of reasons. First, the Supreme Court has described the Equal Pro-
tection Clause as, in essence, a directive that "all persons similarly situated
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• . . be treated alike." 142 A representation reinforcing framework would not
dictate any actual treatment towards "Red Flag" groups or convey any ac-
tual rights to the member of such groups. The only benefits the statute can be
said to confer on "Red Flag" groups are a requirement that congressional
committees issue impact statements explaining the effect that new laws
would have on "Red Flag" groups and a procedural presumption against
requiring "Red Flag" groups to bear the costs of legislation that benefits the
few. These procedural rules impose deliberative duties on members of Con-
gress, but they do not guarantee any specific consequences in favor of or
against any group. In fact, Congress can ignore them if it wishes. If, for
example, a congressional committee fails to issue the impact statement or
votes to enact a new law that imposes disproportionate costs to benefits on a
"Red Flag" group, the only enforcement mechanism provided by the frame-
work is for a member of Congress to raise a parliamentary point of order
against the proposed law in question. If no member of Congress raises a
point of order against the proposal, or if a majority of each chamber votes to
waive a point of order that is raised, then simply, the new proposal is voted
upon as though the framework did not exist. The framework does not confer
any private rights on individual members of "Red Flag" groups, or on the
groups as a whole; it merely seeks to influence Congress's deliberative pro-
cess. "Red Flag" groups and their individual members are given no tangible
rights and cannot sue in court to force Congress to abide by the framework's
procedural rules. 43
Second, even conceding for the sake of argument that the procedural
obligations imposed by the framework might confer unique rights on "Red
Flag" groups, the baseline criteria for identifying "Red Flag" groups in no
way amount to classifications based on suspect or quasi-suspect criteria such
as race, religion, national origin, or sex. Accordingly, any equal protection
challenge against the representation reinforcement framework would be
evaluated under the "rational basis" test, which requires merely that the rep-
resentation reinforcement framework statute's "Red Flag" group classifica-
tions be "reasonably related" to a "legitimate" state interest.' 44 It is of
course exceedingly rare for a statute to fail the rational basis test, and it is
difficult to imagine a court declaring the national interest in giving voice to
142 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
143 If desired, the representation reinforcement framework statute itself could make this
explicit. But this is not necessary. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent makes clear that
Congress's failure to comply with its own procedural rules, whether dictated by the Constitu-
tion or by statute, does not serve as grounds for judicial invalidation of a statute that has met
the bicameralism and presentment requirements in Article I, §7. See, e.g., United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (tax legislation that improperly
"originated" in the Senate rather than the House cannot be invalidated where the House did
not object and legislation was enacted in accordance with Article I, §7 procedures).
144 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ("[L]egislation is presumed to be valid and will be sus-
tained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est."); see also Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992).
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traditionally under-represented groups "illegitimate," or deeming a repre-
sentation reinforcing framework statute not "reasonably related" to this
interest.
In addition, the use of a commission to recommend a list of "Red Flag"
groups may face a constitutional challenge based on the nondelegation doc-
trine. The nondelegation doctrine is a principle which dictates that the
United States Congress cannot delegate the legislative powers conferred
upon it by Article I, §7 of the federal Constitution to any other entity. But
the Supreme Court long has recognized that "in our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever-changing and more technical problems, Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives"' 45 and accordingly has ruled such delegations constitu-
tional as long as Congress provides an "intelligible principle" to guide the
delegatee:
In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance
from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance
must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent neces-
sities of the government co-ordination. So long as Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden dele-
gation of legislative power. 146
Under this standard, the proposed framework's specification of baseline cri-
teria for determining which groups should be placed on the "Red Flag" list
would constitute just such an "intelligible principle" to which the commis-
sion would be "directed to conform" in formulating its "Red Flag" recom-
mendations. Indeed, the Supreme Court's track record in nondelegation cases
has been exceptionally deferential towards Congress. Only twice in the
Court's history has it held that a congressional delegation of power violated
the "nondelegation" doctrine. 147 Moreover, the Court's ruling on a related
issue in a case involving the base closure statute implies the constitutionality
of a system which uses a commission to submit recommendations to the
President for an up or down vote, backstopped by a congressional right of
disapproval. In that case, Dalton v. Specter, 41 certain Senators brought suit
under the Administrative Procedure Act 149 ("APA"), alleging that the Secre-
141 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
146 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
"' See Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 412-13 (1935) (a special case, as it was
discovered mid-litigation that the particular exercise of the power at issue contained no legally
operative sentence); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-525
(1935) (striking down a broad delegation authorizing private parties to establish a "fair compe-
tition" standard and to promulgate rules applying that standard to almost all American
industries).
148511 U.S. 462 (1994).
149 5 U.S.C. § 500-559 (2006).
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tary and the Commission did not follow the procedural mandates of base
closure statute. The Court ruled that the actions of the Secretary and the
Commission were not reviewable "final agency actions" within the meaning
of the APA because the reports recommending base closings carried no di-
rect consequences unless approved by the President. 150 The Court further
ruled that the President's decision to approve or disapprove the Commis-
sion's recommendations was not subject to judicial review because "when
the statute in question commits the decision to the discretion of the Presi-
dent" the President's decision is beyond the reach of judicial power.'5'
IV. THE COURT-CONGRESS DIALOGUE: AN ENDURING
ROLE FOR THE JUDICIARY
The "Legal Process" school of thought, which heavily influenced the
development of American law during the 1950s and 1960s, recognized that
each organ of government has a special competence or expertise.' In fact,
Legal Process theorists posited that "the key to good government is not just
figuring out the best policy, but also identifying which institutions should be
making which decisions and how the different institutions can collaborate
most productively."'' 53 Part II of this paper articulated why the legislature,
not the judiciary, is the appropriate and most competent institution to ad-
dress the problem of representational inequality. Part III elaborated one
model for how the legislature might seek to remedy this legislative process
dysfunction. This Part takes up the second prong of the Legal Process pre-
cept, contemplating how Congress and the courts can collaborate most pro-
ductively towards greater equality of representation.
A. Reinforcing Legislative Transparency
Judges and legislators come at the representational inequality problem
from different angles. Legislators deal with the problem ex ante, as they try
to predict the consequences of proposed legislation and weigh the antici-
pated benefits against the anticipated costs. Judges witness the actual harm
caused to a particular group in a concrete case, albeit cabined by which
litigants are able to bring lawsuits, but are ill-equipped to weigh the harms
' Dalton, 511 U.S. at 469.
'5' Id. at 473.
52 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2032-33 (1994). The legal process school was a movement within
American law that attempted to chart a third way between legal formalism and legal realism. It
is associated with scholars such as Herbert Wechsler, Henry Hart, Albert Sacks and Lon Fuller
and their students, John Hart Ely and Alexander Bickel.
153 Id. at 2033 (citing Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme
Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARv. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935) and Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 HARV. L.
REV. 579, 617-24 (1940)).
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they witness against benefits that may not be apparent in the case before
them. As others have noted, 4 the two branches have much to learn from
each other and could do a significantly better job of signaling to each other
than they currently do. This Part suggests two new twists on well-worn tools
of statutory interpretation designed to facilitate such cross-institutional sig-
naling: (1) process-based clear statement rules; and (2) process-based legis-
lative history.
1. Process-Based Clear Statement Rules
Clear statement rules have been the subject of increasing scholarly at-
tention over the past two decades. 55 William Eskridge and Philip Frickey in
particular have devoted much ink to them, famously calling the Rehnquist
Court's resort to such rules akin to "quasi-constitutional lawmaking" and
chastising that Court for using such rules to engage in "countermajoritarian"
and "Lochner-style" judicial review. 56 Notably, the clear statement rules to
which Eskridge and Frickey referred were substantive in nature, 57 designed
to protect under-enforced constitutional norms-e.g., the nondelegation doc-
trine, separation of powers principles, and most conspicuously, federalism
limitations on the national government-against accidental or undeliberated
'5 See, e.g., Judge James L. Buckley, Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference
of the District of Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 313 (1989) (moderating a symposium on
improving communication between the judiciary and Congress in order to better the quality of
statutes, their interpretation, and their revision); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory
Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653
(1992); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 183 (1986)
(arguing that greater understanding between the judiciary and legislature of one another's con-
straints in performing their functions would lead to better legislation and better statutory inter-
pretation); Abner J. Mikva, Statutory Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 982 (1989) (stressing the importance of "bridg[ing] the gulf between those
who produce legislative history and those who digest it"); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and
Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 279, 279, 281 (1991) (noting that the
"complexities of the law-making and law-interpreting tasks in the third century of this republic
cry out for systematic dialogue between those who make and those who interpret
legislation.").
"I See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 49; William P. Marshall, The Eleventh
Amendment, Process Federalism and the Clear Statement Rule, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 345
(1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement
Rules, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 823 (2005); John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immu-
nity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 771 (1995); Larry J. Obhof,
Federalism, I Presume? A Look at the Enforcement of Federalism Principles Through Pre-
sumptions and Clear Statement Rules, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 123 (2004); Michael P. Lee,
Comment, How Clear Is "Clear"?: A Lenient Interpretation of the Gregory v. Ashcroft Clear
Statement Rule, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1998); Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and
Congressional Regulation of States, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1959 (1994); Laura E. Walvoord,
Comment, A Critique of Torcasio v. Murray and the Use of the Clear Statement Rule to Inter-
pret the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1183 (1996).
'56 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 49, at 597-98; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 81-87 (1994).
' Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 49, at 595 (calling such rules "'substantive' canons").
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infringement. Clear statement rules operate by establishing a default pre-
sumption that Congress does not intend to enact statutes that undermine con-
stitutional norms, and by requiring Congress to express its intent to
contravene a particular constitutional norm directly, on the face of the stat-
ute, if it wishes to overcome that presumption.'58 What I propose in the rep-
resentation reinforcement context, by contrast, is a procedural clear
statement rule that reinforces Congress's own precommitment to representa-
tional equality, as embodied in a framework statute.
Under the procedural clear statement rule, when courts are faced with a
statutory provision that harms a "Red Flag" group, or with a choice between
a narrow versus expansive statutory construction that would harm/burden/
impose costs upon a "Red Flag" group (as defined by Congress in its frame-
work statute), courts should look to whether Congress, either on the face of
the statute or in its "interest impact" statement to CBO/GAO, identified the
"Red Flag" group as one it expected or intended for the statute to burden.
This proposal differs from the clear statement rules advocated by the second-
generation representation reinforcement scholars in that it asks for a clear
statement that Congress intended, or at least was aware of, the costs a partic-
ular statute ultimately imposes on a politically under-represented group-
rather than for a clear statement that Congress intended a statutory wealth
transfer to a particular rent-seeking interest. Again, the immediate focus
would be not so much on impeding rent-seeking deals-though this might
be a welcome secondary benefit' 9-as on guarding against inadvertent leg-
islative disadvantage or harm to traditionally underrepresented groups.
If the court finds that Congress did in fact identify the "Red Flag"
group as one that would bear costs under the statute-either in the statute
itself or in the impact statement to CBO/GAO-then it should construe any
statutory ambiguities using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, ap-
plying no special presumptions in favor of the under-represented group. 16°
But if Congress nowhere indicated an intent or understanding that the "Red
Flag" group would be harmed or bear costs under the statute, then the court
should proceed to take a process-focused look at the statute's legislative
history.
2. Process-Based Legislative History
Where there is no clear statement of congressional intent or acknowl-
edgment that a "Red Flag" group would be adversely affected by the statu-
tory provision at issue, I submit that courts should look, as an empirical
matter, at which groups Congress consulted during the legislative process. In
other words, courts should review the legislative history to determine: (1)
15 8 Id. at 630-31.
'59 See discussion supra Part Il.B.4, at 50-51.
'6 There are, of course, exceptions-such as where a statute harms a constitutionally pro-
tected group. See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
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from whom Congress took testimony while drafting and deliberating on the
statute; and (2) which groups lobbied for or against the statute. 6 As dis-
cussed earlier in this Article, such an interpretive approach is analogous to
the "hard look" and "danger signals" doctrines courts use when reviewing
administrative regulations: in recognition of the public choice concept that
legislatures may become "captured" by wealthy, organized interests and out
of touch with diffuse, unorganized ones, courts would give legislation that
adversely affects a "Red Flag" group a "hard look" to ensure that it is the
product of a careful, even-handed, deliberative process. The difference is
that courts in the administrative context essentially must read tea leaves to
identify amorphous "danger signals" indicating that an agency may have
been captured, and have no clear set of rules for determining whether an
agency has engaged in adequate deliberation. Courts in the legislative repre-
sentation reinforcement context, by contrast, would be able to rely on Con-
gress' own "Red Flag" list of endangered groups on whose behalf a "hard
look" should be triggered, as well as on a statute's legislative history, for
evidence of whether Congress engaged in adequate deliberation. Such an
interpretive approach, in turn, should give Congress extra incentive to seek
input from "Red Flag" groups and reinforce Congress's precommitment,
through its framework statute, to correct the legislative process' tendency
towards representational inequality.
If, upon conducting a "hard look" at the legislative history of a statute
that adversely affects a "Red Flag" group, the court finds no evidence that
the group (or a surrogate organization representing the group's interests) 62
participated in the legislative process that produced the statute-and Con-
gress has made no clear statement in the statute's text or in the committee's
impact statement to CBO/GAO indicating an awareness or intent to burden
the "Red Flag" group-the court should construe the statute in favor of the
"Red Flag" group. The court should be very clear about why it is ruling as it
is, making an explicit statement to the effect that:
Congress, in the Transparency in Legislation Act, has flagged
group X as particularly in danger of exclusion from the political
marketplace and has set in place legislative procedures to ensure,
and to record the fact that, it legislates with knowledge of the im-
pact that proposed statutes will have on group X. The legislative
history of Act Y, at issue in this case, indicates that Congress was
not aware of the burden that Act Y would impose on group X, and
that group X did not participate in the political process leading up
to the enactment of Act Y. Because Congress itself has, in the
Transparency in Legislation Act, professed a commitment not to
161 Recall that the lobbying information will be provided by Congress itself as part of its
impact statement to CBO/GAO. See discussion supra pp. 54-57.
162 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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impose burdens on group X inadvertently or without due delibera-
tion, we now respect that commitment and construe Act Y to work
minimal harm on group X-and invite Congress to reassess and
revise Act Y if it deems the harm to group X to be justified in this
instance.
In other words, courts should treat the congressional precommitment estab-
lished in the representation reinforcing framework statute as creating a pre-
sumption against the enactment of legislation that harms or disadvantages
"Red Flag" groups without ensuring that "Red Flag" groups are given some
voice in the deliberative process preceding such legislation. Congress can
rebut this presumption in one of two ways: (1) with a clear statement, in the
statute's text or in the committee's impact statement to CBO/GAO, indicating
its expectation that a "Red Flag" group will face certain costs or burdens
under the statute; or (2) by showing that the "Red Flag" group's concerns
were taken into account or represented during the legislative process.
It is important to note that under this Article's proposed process-based
approach, legislative history would be used not for its substance (to divine
intent), but as evidence of a fair process-i.e., as a catalogue or record of
which groups' interests were represented during the drafting and deliberative
stages of a statute's formulation. Again, courts would be asking "who
(which group) is harmed by the statute or interpretation at issue? Did that
group actually participate in the legislative process?" rather than the tradi-
tional legislative history query of "what did Congress say about the meaning
of this particular word or phrase (in committee reports, members' statements
on the floor, etc.)?" This Article's process-based approach also would differ
significantly from Eskridge's "hierarchy of political disadvantage" rule in
that Eskridge is unconcerned with evaluating what deliberative process actu-
ally took place for a particular statute. He does not ask, or direct courts to
ask, whether a group disadvantaged by a statute in fact participated in the
legislative process leading to the statute's enactment; he asks only where the
group falls on his hierarchy of relative political advantage, and prescribes a
blanket interpretive presumption in favor of the litigant whose group places
lower on that hierarchy-even if the disadvantaged group participated, but
lost out, in the legislative process when the statute originally was enacted.
Notably, this Article's proposed process-based approach to judicial re-
view is not without some precedent. In fact, it shares similarities with Justice
Stevens' recommendation that courts in political gerrymandering cases limit
their review of state legislatures' line-drawing to determining whether the
minority political party was consulted during the redistricting process.'63 Jus-
tice Stevens' preferred approach, like this Article's proposed approach,
would begin with a facial perusal of the criticized districting plan (statute)
for obvious "warning flags" (danger signals) such as unusual district shape,
163 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 759 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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lack of geographical compactness, or disregarding of county boundaries (ad-
verse impact on a "Red Flag" group). 14 A districting plan that contains such
warning flags, like a statute that harms a "Red Flag" group, in turn would
"prompt[ ] an inquiry into the process" that led to the plan's (statute's)
adoption. 65 The court then would examine the process for formulating the
districting plan to determine whether it was neutral, rather than partisan, and
afforded "adequate opportunity for the presentation and consideration of dif-
fering points of view." 166 If so, a "strong presumption of validity should
attach to whatever plan such a process produced."'67 If, on the other hand,
the process was partisan, excluded divergent viewpoints, and provided no
explanation for why one plan was selected over another, then there should be
a presumption of unfair/improper districting. 168 The political gerrymandering
doctrine is a particularly good analogue to the representation reinforcement
problem because in both cases, the underlying goal is to ensure access to the
political process-by voters on the one hand, and interest groups on the
other.
Still one might wonder whether such process-based review might not
inspire legislators to attempt to game the system, by inviting certain interests
to the table only to guard against judicial chastisement, without any real
intent to listen to them? This certainly is a possibility, perhaps even a
probability. But if so, it still would be better than the current system, in
which legislators tend to ignore diffuse, disorganized groups altogether. In-
deed, behavioral science 169 and interest group 7 ° studies show that once
64 Id. at 760-63. In Karcher, Justice Stevens found the district configurations to be "un-
couth" and "bizarre," and went to some lengths to describe one new district called "the
Swan," that twisted and stretched from the New York suburbs to the rural upper reaches of the
Delaware River and contained segments of at least seven counties. Another, called "the Fish-
hook," comprised of parts of five counties, that cut "a curving partisan path through industrial
Elizabeth, liberal, academic Princeton and largely Jewish Marlboro in Monmouth County." Id.
at 762-63.
165 Id. at 763.
166 Id. at 759.167 Id.
168 Id. Justice Stevens concluded that the districting process in Karcher had been ex-
tremely partisan, excluding Republicans, and rejecting many geographically sensible district-
ing configurations in favor of one that heavily favored the Democratic party. Id. at 764.
169 The theory is called "group polarization." See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loaf-
ing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486,
535-36 (2002) (citing Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Burnstein, Effects of Partially Shared Per-
suasive Arguments on Group-Induced Shifts: A Group-Problem-Solving Approach, 29 J. PER-
SONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHoL. 305, 306-07 (1974)); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?
Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74-75 (2000) (quoting JOHN C. TURNER ET
AL., REDISCOVERING THE SocIL. GROUP 142 (1987)). The theory holds that when the outcome
of a decision can be placed on a normative scale, such as being liberal rather than conservative,
then if all of the members of a group charged with making a decision are on one end of the
scale, that dynamic itself can drive the group to choose an outcome that is on one end of the
scale rather than in the middle. Seidenfeld, supra, at 535. One posited reason for this is that
group discussion sways a member according to the number and strength of new arguments that
the member hears for or against an outcome; thus if only one side is presenting its views,
group members will become aware of more plausible arguments for that outcome than against
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marginalized interests are included in the dialogue and given an opportunity
to voice their concerns, even hostile legislators will be somewhat influenced
by them. The very act of including "Red Flag" groups in the "argument
pool" leading up to the enactment of a statute will be good for the delibera-
tive process, as "[m]ajority rule ... suffers when it is not constrained by the
need to bargain with minority interests."'' Experiences with informational
regulation and disclosure requirements in the environmental and financial
contexts similarly teach that legislators are likely to "manage what they
measure,"'7 meaning that once forced to confront information of which they
had not previously been aware (about costs to "Red Flag" groups), legisla-
tors may make different decisions than they otherwise would have, simply as
a result of gaining additional information to evaluate.' Thus, if Congress
does choose to harm a "Red Flag" group even after hearing from its repre-
sentatives, at least it will be doing so consciously and in a somewhat public
manner (because of the impact report and clear statement requirement), and
perhaps it will impose fewer costs on the group than it otherwise would
have.
it. Id. By contrast, if the argument pool is expanded, and new members with opposing views
add plausible arguments to the debate, the decision will move towards the middle of the scale.
See Sunstein, supra, at 95-96.
7 0 See, e.g., H. SELECT COMM. ON LOBBYING AcTIVITIES, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS
ON FEDERAL LOBBYING ACT, H.R. REP. No. 81-3239 (1951); S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, 99TH CONG., CONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS: LOBBYING IN A MODERN DEMOC-
RACY 13 (1986) ("When groups push on both sides of an issue, officials can more freely
exercise their judgment than when the groups push only on one side." (quoting LESTER MIL-
BRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS 345 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Diana
M. Evans, Lobbying the Committee: Interest Groups and the House Public Works and Trans-
portation Committee, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 257, 257-59 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A.
Loomis eds., 1991) (concluding, based on a study of the House Public Works and Transporta-
tion Committee's behavior during consideration of a highway reauthorization bill, that interest
groups are most effective at getting the majority of their policy preferences accepted when
they face no competition for elected officials' attention from opposing interests).
171 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRE-
SENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 9 (1994) (quoted in William N. Eskridge, Pluralism and Distrust:
How Courts Can Support Democracy By Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279,
1295 & n.73 (2005)).
172 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Per-
formance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 299 (2001) (quot-
ing Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What
You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1996)).
'73 See Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational
Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 783 (2006) (quoting Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 297).
Oldfather observes that:
[Tihe very process of complying with a disclosure requirement can also lead to
changes in the underlying activity independent of the effects of external monitoring.
The phrase often associated with this effect is "you manage what you measure." To
the extent a disclosure requirement leads the regulated entity to compile information
it had not previously gathered, the entity may make different decisions than it other-
wise would have, simply as a result of having additional information to take into
consideration in its decision-making process.
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But what should a court do if a group harmed or burdened by a statute
is not a "Red Flag" group, yet the court believes it to be disadvantaged or
under-represented? Should it look to the statute's text and legislative history
for a clear statement or for evidence that the group was consulted during the
legislative process, and construe the statute in the group's favor if not? I
believe the answer should be twofold. On the one hand, the judiciary can and
must intervene on behalf of constitutionally-protected Carolene groups, such
as African Americans and Native Americans. The Constitution demands as
much. But, on the other hand, if the group in question is neither a "Red
Flag" group nor a constitutionally-protected one, then the court must con-
strue the statute using its traditional interpretive tools, with no scale-tipping
in favor of the group. To be sure, the courts can and should look to see
whether Congress consulted such groups during the legislative process, but
even if Congress did not, courts should not stray from traditional rules of
statutory interpretation, or apply automatic presumptions, to find in favor of
such groups. That is the essence of legislative, rather than ad hoc judicial,
determination of what groups are entitled to reinforced representation.
At the same time, however, such situations present an ideal opportunity
for the courts to start a cross-institutional conversation with Congress. The
Supreme Court in particular could suggest to Congress in the text of an opin-
ion that certain groups harmed by a statute are ones which should be added
to the "Red Flag" list in the future. 74 It may turn out that the groups the
courts recommend are ones Congress did not realize would be harmed by the
statute in the first instance, and for whom no CBO/GAO impact analysis was
conducted during the original enactment process. In such cases, the courts'
institutional positioning, and their ability to see post hoc the impact that a
statute in fact has, could be used to inform Congress and possibly to inspire
changes to the legislative process (via revisions to the "Red Flag" list) in the
future.
B. Checking The Legislature
As this last point suggests, courts not only must reinforce, but also
check Congress's treatment of politically disadvantaged, under-represented
groups during the legislative process. But they must do so in fine balance,
without crossing the line into judicial super-legislating. This Section dis-
cusses two interpretive rules designed to assist courts in performing such a
calibrated checking-and-balancing function. These rules could be suggested
to courts by Congress in a separate section of the proposed framework stat-
ute titled, "Interpreting the Transparency in Legislation Act," or they could
be adopted by courts on their own, as are most other interpretive rules.
174 See, e.g., Katzmann, supra note 154, at 665-66 (discussing ways in which courts might
transmit criticisms and suggestions to the legislature).
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1. Broader Standing Rules
William Eskridge has argued, in the administrative context, that inter-
pretive rules can be used to keep the regulation-formation process open to
diverse perspectives and to ensure representation of diffuse groups who
Congress may have intended as the beneficiaries of a statute, but who regu-
lators implementing the statute might slight in favor of narrow interests who
have captured the regulators.175 In particular, Eskridge criticizes the Supreme
Court's decision in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 76 in which the
Court refused to allow consumers to seek judicial review of orders issued by
the Secretary of Agriculture setting floor prices for milk handlers to pay to
milk producers. 17 7 Eskridge points out that for consumers, a diffuse and
badly organized group, the result of the Secretary's orders was higher prices.
Thus, the Court's decision denying consumers standing enabled an unfair
system to remain in place, whereas allowing judicial review could have
helped "retrieve the statutory purpose by opening up the calcified adminis-
trative process to consumer pressure."' 78 For similar reasons, Eskridge has
hailed the class action lawsuit as a device that enables diffusely interested
groups who go unrepresented in the political process to become represented
in litigation, through "entrepreneurial counsel," who organize the group and
are financed by fees payable out of class action awards. 17 9
Combining these two insights, I advocate that courts adopt broader
standing rules empowering members of "Red Flag" groups to challenge
statutes that harm them almost as a matter of course. This could mean revis-
ing the Court's own precedents requiring standing requirements as applied to
members of "Red Flag" groups, as well as broad judicial construction of
statutes granting standing or involving the ability to sue in certain types of
cases. The idea would be to give consumers, tort victims (who cannot organ-
ize because they do not know who they are until after they have become
victims), and perhaps even certain categories of taxpayers broad power to
sue, so that even if members of these diffuse groups are left out of the loop
during the legislative process, attorney entrepreneurs can organize for them
after the fact and represent their interests in court. In other words, where the
legislative corrective embodied in the framework statute fails, perhaps be-
cause there are no surrogate organizations representing the interests of a par-
ticular group or because existing surrogate organizations are unable to
anticipate a potential harm to a group, attorneys can act as second-round
surrogates and, through the use of devices such as class actions and negli-
gence suits, bring to light problems that might eventually catch the legisla-
75 See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 159.
176 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
1
7 7 See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 159.
178 Id.
179 See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 6, at 304.
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ture's eye. Indeed, in this light, existing statutes and legal rules barring
standing for members of diffuse groups may be criticized as impediments to
diffuse groups' access to the political process-in that they cut off surrogates
who might be ready to agitate or organize on behalf of a diffuse group.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation5 ° offers a good case study for how a broader standing rule could
work. That case involved an executive order that created a White House
office and centers within federal agencies to assist faith-based community
groups in competing for federal financial support. 8' Members of the Free-
dom From Religion Foundation ("FFRF"), an organization opposed to gov-
ernment endorsement of religion, brought suit challenging certain actions
taken by the directors of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Com-
munity Initiatives.'82 FFRF and its members asserted standing based on the
fact that the members were federal taxpayers opposed to the Executive
Branch's use of congressional appropriations (federal tax dollars) for these
conferences.'83 The Seventh Circuit accepted FFRF's assertion of standing,
holding that taxpayers have standing to challenge any action taken by a fed-
eral agency so long as the marginal or incremental cost to the public of the
alleged (here, Establishment Clause-violating) action is greater than zero.? 4
The Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, disagreed. It held that a taxpayer's
mere objection to the manner in which federal tax dollars are spent, even if
based on the taxpayer's interest in ensuring that federal dollars are not spent
in violation of the Constitution, is "too [ ] attenuated" to constitute the
"kind of redressable 'personal injury'" required for Article III standing.'85
The analysis in this Article suggests a middle-ground approach to this
problem of taxpayer standing. Rather than flatly refuse taxpayers standing to
challenge laws or agency actions that may have been promulgated without
adequate consideration of their impact on a diffuse and unorganized group
(the practical effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in almost all cases), or
conversely, grant taxpayers automatic standing in virtually every case (the
practical effect of a "standing-whenever-the-marginal-cost-to-the-public-ex-
ceeds-zero" rule), this Article would recommend a third way: taxpayers
should be given standing to challenge federal statutes or agency actions so
long as they are able to make a prima facie evidentiary showing that the ratio
11o 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
181 Id. at 2555.
182 Specifically, they charged that the directors violated the Establishment Clause by or-
ganizing conferences that were designed to promote, and had the effect of promoting, religious
community groups over secular ones-by, for example, singling out faith-based organizations
as being "particularly worthy of federal funding" and "extoll[ing]" the belief in God as the
distinguishing feature responsible for the effectiveness of faith-based social services. Id. at
2560 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 73a, Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2558 (No. 06-157)).
183 Id. at 2561 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 69a, Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2558 (No.
06-157)).
' Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).
'8s Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2563 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1976)).
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of the statute's or agency action's cost to the public versus the benefits con-
ferred by the statute or agency action exceeds a threshold figure, which ide-
ally could be statutorily-prescribed. In this way, taxpayer standing would be
conferred only in those instances where it is most likely that the challenged
federal action has failed adequately to balance costs against benefits.
2. An Ely-Rule
Recall that one of Ely's paradigm cases for when judicial invalidation
of legislative enactments is justified is where legislators are so hostile or
prejudiced against a minority group that they systematically deny the minor-
ity rights and protections given to other groups. 186 This paradigm can be
taken one step further, to create an interpretive rule that asks whether a par-
ticular construction of a statute would have the effect of shutting a "Red
Flag" group out of the political process. In other words, Courts could sup-
plement Congress's representation reinforcement framework by adopting a
new substantive canon dictating that: Where a statute has two or more plau-
sible interpretations, one of which effectively would shut a "Red Flag"
group out of the political process, then that interpretation should be rejected.
This rule should apply even in the unlikely event that Congress has ex-
pressed an intent to shut the "Red Flag" group out of the political process.
The Ely Rule would differ from the process-based clear statement rule in
that it would focus on how a statutory interpretation affects a "Red Flag"
group's access to the political process, rather than on whether an interpreta-
tion imposes costs on the "Red Flag" group. The Ely Rule, moreover, would
refuse to enforce even an avowed congressional intent to exclude a "Red
Flag" group from the political process. That is, it would refuse to sanction a
congressional statement that "we meant to shut this group out of the political
process." Instead, as a corollary to the process-based legislative history ap-
proach advocated above, which asks "What groups were given input or con-
sulted in the past, when the statute was drafted?", the Ely Rule would ask
the forward-looking question, "What effect will this statute or interpretation
have on a 'Red Flag' group's ability to participate in the lawmaking process
in the future?"
An Elysian rule of this sort of course would have its roots in the Equal
Protection Clause, which generally was aimed at preventing "class legisla-
tion" and designed to augur against the establishment of an out-caste, or
group of citizens who are permanent losers in politics.'87 The rule likewise
would be supported by the Due Process Clause, which requires that a neutral
rule of law be applied to all persons and at least implies that the law will not
186 See supra notes 2, 13-14 and accompanying text.
87 Eskridge, supra note 171, at 1308 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and WIL-
LIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE (1988) (surveying the ratification debates)).
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be applied arbitrarily against a disfavored class or group.'88 In addition, the
rule would aim to protect the First Amendment's blanket guarantee to all
individuals of a right "to petition Government for a redress of
grievances."" 9
Further, like the process-based legislative history approach, the pro-
posed Elysian rule has some precedent in prior Supreme Court doctrine. In
Thornburg v. Gingles,90 for example, the Court held that the relevant inquiry
in determining if Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been violated
should be whether "as a result of the challenged practice or structure plain-
tiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes
and to elect candidates of their choice."'' The difference between the Ely-
rule and current equal protection analysis, however, is that whereas the latter
merely dictates that any statute or interpretation that attempts to infringe on
a particular group's right to participate equally in the political process must
be subjected to strict scrutiny, and upheld only if supported by a compelling
state interest, the Ely-rule would dictate that if the infringed group is a "Red
Flag" group, then the infringing statute or interpretation would be presump-
tively void, or at least unenforceable by the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The second-generation representation reinforcement scholars have iden-
tified and undertaken a salient task in seeking to remedy the legislative pro-
cess problem of representational inequality. But in focusing solely on the
judicial interpretation of statutes and ignoring the legislative side of things,
they have offered the wrong, or at least an incomplete, solution. The remedy
to this legislative process dysfunction should not be a one-dimensional one
that looks merely to what the judiciary can do to fix the mess made by the
legislature; it should be one that encourages the legislature to correct the
dysfunction at its roots and provides judicial rules to encourage and rein-
force the legislative corrective.
In this sense, the framework and judicial rules of construction proposed
in this Article can be seen as part of a larger project to make courts and
Congress work together to ensure a deliberative legislative process. Courts
should reinforce-not reengineer-broad participation and representation of
all interests in the legislative process, and should seek to encourage thor-
ough, balanced legislative deliberation. But these ends should not be
achieved through judicial usurpation of the task of balancing competing in-
' Id. (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (stating that due process rule of
law includes an anti-unreasonableness feature)).
189 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'9478 U.S. 30 (1986).
I9' d. at 44 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982)).
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terests' claims; they should be achieved through judicial-and scholarly-
encouragement of a congressional precommitment to broader representation
and participation.

